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I. Introduction
As a nation, we derive vast economic benefits from competition in free markets.  These 
benefits should not be taken for granted; they – and the competition that yields them – are not 
immutable.  The nation’s consumer protection policy can have profound effects on such benefits.  
The policy can enhance these benefits by strengthening the market.  The policy can also reduce 
these benefits, however, by unduly intruding upon the market and hampering the competitive 
process.  The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) has a special responsibility 
to protect and speak for the competitive process, to combat practices that harm the market, and to 
advocate against policies that reduce competition’s benefits to consumers.
The FTC protects consumers through its responsibility to prevent “unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices.”2   The FTC, and other public institutions, also operate against a backdrop of 
other consumer protection institutions, most notably the market and private contract and tort law.  
This paper seeks to provide a perspective on the rationale for how the agency should formulate 
1
  Chairman, Federal Trade Commission. The views here are mine, not those of any other 
Commissioner.  I would like to thank William E. Kovacic, Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Todd J. 
Zywicki, and the staff of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection for their help in preparing 
this paper.  I would also like to thank Thomas Krattenmaker for his helpful comments.
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  15 U.S.C. § 45.
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consumer protection policy, identifying how the agency at the millennium fits in the scheme of 
institutions for consumer protection and its comparative advantages in carrying out this role.  
The paper has three parts.  The first describes the system of institutions for consumer 
protection in the American economy and how they interrelate.  It begins with our market 
economy, in which producers compete to offer the most appealing mix of price and quality.  This 
competition spurs producers to meet consumer expectations because the market generally 
imposes strict discipline on sellers who disappoint consumers and thus lose sales to producers 
who better meet consumer needs.  These same competitive pressures also encourage producers to 
provide truthful information about their offerings.  Market mechanisms cannot always effectively 
discipline deceptive sellers, however, such as when product attributes are difficult to evaluate or 
sellers are unconcerned about repeat business.
 When competition alone cannot punish or deter seller dishonesty, another institution can 
mitigate these problems.  Private legal rights – property, contract, and tort law – provide a set of 
basic rules for interactions between producers and consumers.  Government can also serve a 
useful role by providing default rules, which apply when parties do not specify rules.  These 
rights and default rules alleviate some of the weaknesses in the market system by reducing the 
consequences to the buyer arising from a problematic exchange.  Notwithstanding the strengths 
of private legal rights, in some circumstances – such as when court enforcement is impractical or 
economically infeasible –  they may not be an effective deterrent .
The paper argues that when consumers are vulnerable because market forces are 
insufficient and the common law is ineffective, a public agency, such as the Federal Trade 
Commission, may shore up these other institutions by preserving competition and protecting 
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consumers.  The FTC’s consumer protection and competition missions naturally complement 
each other by protecting consumers from fraud or deception without restricting their market 
choices or their ability to obtain truthful information about products or services.  The paper also 
describes the Commission’s positive agenda which animates its principles for enhancing 
consumer welfare and makes the best use of the agency’s institutional abilities.  The bedrock 
principle of the FTC’s positive agenda is that robust competition in a strong market is the 
primary bulwark of consumer protection.  Thus, the Commission acts on two fronts: promoting 
competition and the free exchange of accurate and non-misleading information and taking 
aggressive enforcement against conduct that undermines competition and impedes the exchange 
of accurate information and poses the greatest threat to consumers.
The second section of the paper details how the FTC’s proper place in this system of 
institutions for consumer protection guides the design of specific consumer protection initiatives.  
Starting with the agency’s top priority – stopping conduct that causes the greatest threat to 
consumers –  this section details the FTC’s actions against fraud and then discusses the 
regulation of advertising, with an emphasis on matters involving health claims.  It next illustrates
how the agency uses its unique institutional capabilities to formulate new rules in response to 
changed situations by examining the FTC’s initiatives on privacy and spam, including the 
recently-created national Do Not Call registry.  Continuing the theme of adaption to change, this 
section concludes with examples of the Commission working to meet new challenges brought 
about by increasing globalization and e-commerce.
The paper concludes by discussing the critical importance to sensible policymaking of 
continuing efforts to increase the Commission’s research and development function – the 
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systematic effort to improve the base of knowledge that informs the agency’s diverse initiatives 
in the face of changes in the economic and policymaking environment at home and abroad.  
Using as examples the FTC’s workshops on possible barriers to e-commerce and on the costs 
and benefits of the collection and use of consumer information, the paper examines how the 
Commission uses its distinctive institutional strengths to ensure that it understands new 
conditions and crafts appropriate responses.  
II. General Principles  
A. Economic and legal underpinnings and the role of the FTC
How do competition, consumer protection, and the Federal Trade Commission fit into the 
larger picture of the American economy?  In turn, this raises two subsidiary issues.  First, why is 
it desirable to have a government agency as part of this system, instead of just relying on markets 
and the common law?  Second, why should this be a federal competition and consumer 
protection agency?  It is obvious that any society must first make the fundamental choice of an 
economic system, whether it be competition through free enterprise and open markets, 
command-and-control regulation, or public or collective ownership.  The United States has 
largely chosen free enterprise and markets as the organizing principle of our economy.  Free 
enterprise, however, does not mean a system without rules.  Any market economy also needs a 
well-specified structure of property rights, contract law, and other rules of conduct.3
One can envision the American system of consumer protection as a three-legged stool:  a 
first leg of competition based on free enterprise with a second leg the legal structure of contract, 
3 See William E. Kovacic, Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in 
Transition Economics: The Case of Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 265, 269-70 (2001) (describing views of commentators concerning necessary legal 
framework for a market economy). 
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property, and other private law that largely focuses on the relative rights of particular parties.   A 
two-legged stool will not be very stable.  Likewise, markets and private legal rights, while 
indispensable to the American economic system, may falter in key respects.  These legs can 
better support the American economic system when buttressed by a third leg.4  Public agencies –
entrusted to promote consumer welfare by preserving competition and protecting consumers –
work as this third leg, reinforcing the other two.  This paper will elaborate on the strengths and 
limitations of the first two legs, competition and private law, and how agencies, like the Federal 
Trade Commission, function as a third leg to complement these strengths and compensate for the 
limitations of these other institutions.5  This paper will also discuss how the agency has, at times, 
failed to realize its limitations and, instead of complementing these other legs, worked against 
them by interfering with robust competition and consumer choice.  At other times, the FTC has 
been too passive, failing to recognize unique capabilities and the need to supplement the other 
legs.
B. Leg 1:  Competition and its limits
Competition presses producers to offer the most attractive array of price and quality 
options possible.  In competitive industries, the imperative to gain new sales by satisfying 
consumer needs increases the choices available.  Consumers can often determine whether a 
product will satisfy their needs by direct inspection of the product before purchase or by past 
4
  The analogy of the three-legged stool is drawn from Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law 
as Social Legislation, 5 TEX. REV. OF L. & POL. 393, 400 (2001), which applies it in a different 
context.
5
  As discussed throughout this paper, besides the FTC, other agencies exist to pursue 
these priorities, including the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, parts of the Food 
and Drug Administration, many state attorneys general, and local, state, and federal criminal 
enforcement agencies.
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experience with the product.6  In competitive markets, when consumers dislike the offerings of 
one seller, they can turn to others.  This ability to shift expenditures imposes a rigorous discipline 
on each seller to satisfy consumer preferences.  Competition does more than simply increase 
choices for consumers, however.  It motivates sellers to provide truthful, useful information 
about their products7 and drives them to fulfill promises concerning price, quality, and other 
terms of sale.8  Consumers can punish a seller’s deceit or failure to fulfill a promise by voting 
with their feet – and their pocketbooks.  This punishment is usually swift for sellers of products 
purchased frequently whose qualities purchasers can readily evaluate.9
For products purchased infrequently, for which an individual consumer cannot usually 
rely on personal experience to evaluate a seller’s truthfulness, private institutions can help 
provide the information that augments or substitutes for such experience.  For example, third-
party evaluations, such as Consumer Reports magazine, provide information on cars and 
6 See, e.g., J. Howard Beales, III, et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer 
Information, 24 J. L. & ECON. 491, 501 (1981).
7
 See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Regulating Deception, 10 CATO J. 667, 679 (1991) (“There is 
much support in the recent literature for the proposition that, as long as deception is not allowed, 
there are incentives for sellers to disclose even the negative attributes of their products.  This is 
because consumers will rationally assume that any advertisement which omits a critical piece of 
information (say, the durability of a product) will imply that the value of that attribute for that 
product is at the lowest level.”)  See also Beales, et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer 
Information, 24 J. L. & ECON. at 502.  
8 See, e.g., Lester G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27 
(1980) (noting that when a stream of benefits from repeated interaction is promised, and that 
stream of benefits would be lost by acting opportunistically, it is in a party’s self interest to 
forego the one-time gain of opportunism in favor of preserving the prospect of a future stream of 
benefits.)
9
  Each year, tens of thousands of new products are introduced, many of which fail. An 
famous example was the Coca Cola Company’s introduction of its “New Coke”.  Introduced 
with great fanfare, the product fizzled and has virtually disappeared from the market.  
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appliances, which an average consumer may buy once every five, ten, or even twenty years.10
Moreover, sellers may well have an incentive to disclose information to consumers if the mere 
fact that they disseminate information distinguishes them from lower-quality rivals and 
consumers perceive that the average quality of a nondisclosing seller is lower.11  In addition, 
rivals may emphasize the gap between a competitor’s promises and the product it delivers.  
Reputation is also important to sellers,12 and items like company brands and logos implicitly 
convey quality and other important product information.13
Sometimes robust competition alone will not punish or deter seller dishonesty or 
reneging.  For products called “credence goods,” consumers cannot readily use their own 
experiences to assess whether the seller’s quality claims are true.14  Typical consumers know 
10 See, e.g., Consumer Reports magazine, online version available at 
<http://www.consumerreports.org/main/home.jsp>; Cnet Product Reviews available at 
<http://www.cnet.com/>.
11 See Beales, et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J. L. & ECON. 
at 502.
12 See Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. 
REV. 521, 527 (1981) (concluding that reputation is the main constraint on opportunistic 
behavior).
13 See Paul H. Rubin, Regulating Deception, 10 CATO J. 667, 675 (1991) (“Investments 
in non-salvageable firm-specific capital (capital that would become worthless if the firm were to 
shut down) would serve to guarantee quality since the firm would lose the value of these 
investments if consumers dissatisfied with low-quality products forced it to shut down by 
withdrawing patronage.  In addition to advertising, including endorsements by celebrities, such 
capital includes investments in establishing trademarks and brand names, and investments in 
physical assets such as signs and decor.”)
14 See Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of 
Fraud, 16(1) J. OF L. & ECON., 67, 68-69 (Apr. 1973) (“Credence qualities are those which, 
although worthwhile, cannot be evaluated in normal use.  Instead the assessment of their value 
requires additional costly information.  An example would be the claimed advantages of the 
removal of an appendix, which will be correct or not according to whether the organ is diseased.  
The purchaser will have no different experience after the operation whether or not the organ was 
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whether a food product “tastes great;” they cannot judge whether consuming the same product 
reduces the risk of cancer or whether the cost of a car repair included items not necessary to 
restore the vehicle to its full capacity.  Private rating systems help, as do the creation of regional 
or national firms with established reputations that would be severely damaged through exposure 
of deceit or fraud.  Nevertheless, when information is costly to produce and to use or when the 
costs of producing the information are difficult for the information provider to recoup because of 
free-rider problems,15  these market mechanisms will not correct all problems. Moreover, in 
certain circumstances, competing firms may not have strong incentives to identify their rivals’ 
misrepresentations if it would highlight a deficiency common to all such products.16
 For credence goods, the market may not identify and discipline a deceptive seller 
because the product’s qualities are so difficult to measure.17  Moreover, a product market with 
diseased.  A similar example would apply to replacement of a television tube, certain automobile 
repairs and the like.  The line between experience and credence qualities of a good may not 
always be sharp, particularly if they will be discerned in use, but only after the lapse of a 
considerable period of time.”)
15 See, e.g., Beales, et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J. L. & 
ECON. at 503-4.
16
  In part for this reason industries often acquiesce to private restraints on comparative 
advertising claims, particularly restraints on truthful claims that "disparage" competitors’ 
products.  See 16 C.F.R. § 14.15 and discussion, infra, at notes 63-64 and accompanying text.  
This reluctance also justifies certain government actions to require disclosures of health or safety 
risks that are common to a class of products, for example requiring health warnings on tobacco 
products.  See, e.g., Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331- 1340, 
as amended. 
17 See Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of 
Fraud, 16(1) J. OF L. & ECON. 67, 68 (Apr. 1973) (“Hence, the contention that competitive 
markets are sufficient to prevent fraud by, at least, established firms, because of the effect on 
future sales of the eventual discovery of the fraud, does not hold in this case.  The provision of 
joint diagnosis and repair implies that some fraud can be successful because of the high, if not 
prohibitive, costs of discovery of the fraud.”)
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special attributes – consumers cannot determine quality before purchase, higher quality products 
cost more to produce than lower quality products, and firms cannot credibly guarantee quality –
may become a “lemons market” in which only low-quality products are sold.18  Under these 
circumstances, the market mechanism may break down because, in the presence of information 
asymmetries, no seller can convince consumers that it is offering a high-quality product.  
Consumers would pay higher prices for better quality products if they could readily identify 
them; because they cannot, producers cannot recoup the additional costs of manufacture.  
Fortunately, these markets appear to be virtually nonexistent.19
Legitimate companies care about how consumers regard them.  They count on repeat 
business and word-of-mouth endorsements to increase sales.  By contrast, the commercial thief 
loses no sleep over its standing in the community and is unconcerned about repeat business.  
These fraudsters cheat consumers, grab the revenues, and disappear from sight, often to re-
emerge in another guise to steal again.  
When market forces cannot overcome these threats to consumer welfare, e.g., because 
some sellers are unconcerned about repeat business and reputation or because deception is 
difficult to detect because of information asymmetries, there are other ways to regulate 
exchanges.  The second leg of the stool, private legal rights, not only complements the 
competitive market, it can also overcome, or at least mitigate, some of these market problems.
C. Leg 2:  Private legal rights and their limits 
18
  George A. Ackerlof, The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488-500 (Aug. 1970).
19 See Timothy J. Muris, California Dental Association v. FTC: The Revenge of Footnote 
17, 8 S. CT. ECON. REV. 265, 288-89 (2000) (discussing rarity of lemons markets).
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One of the crucial roles for government is to define and allocate property rights.  Courts –
and government agencies – can both be useful in defining and protecting those rights. The triad 
of property, contract, and tort law provide a basic set of legal rules permitting ownership, 
voluntary transference, and protection from involuntary transactions.  David Hume’s treatise on 
human nature specifies “three fundamental rules of nature, that of the stability of possession, of 
its transference by consent, and of the performance of promises.”20
If parties could breach without legal consequence, the voluntary exchange of promises of 
future performance would not disappear, however.21  Indeed, before the rise of formal contract 
law, an active system of voluntary exchanges existed, in which people used credit bureaus, 
bonding, reliance on experience from past dealings, and similar devices to ensure performance.22
Nevertheless, compared to the system of contract law that developed, the alternative system was 
probably inefficient because it was almost certainly more costly.23  Credit bureaus and bonding, 
20
  3 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE § VI (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1888).
21 See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring 
Contractual Performance, 89 J. OF POL. ECON. 615 (1981) (examining the repeat-purchase, 
contract-enforcement mechanism of private arrangements).
22 See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, BANKRUPTCY AND RECIPROCITY: AN EVOLUTIONARY 
ANALYSIS OF PROMISE-KEEPING NORMS, AND BANKRUPTCY LAW 28 (Geo. Mason Univ. Sch. of 
Law, Working Paper, 2001) (“For centuries commerce [based largely on promise-keeping] 
existed outside of the jurisdiction of any political authority . . . Modern commercial law was 
invented and enforced not by governments, but by merchants themselves.”); Daniel B. Klein, 
Promise Keeping in the Great Society: A Model of Credit Information Sharing, from
REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD CONDUCT (Daniel B. Klein, 
ed., Univ. of Mich. Press 1997); Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions 
in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525, 530 (1993).
23
  For certain industries, the system of contract rules can itself be inefficient.  See Lisa 
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond 
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (concluding in study of diamond industry “extralegal 
contracts are more likely to become an industry norm in situations where traditional contract 
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for example, increase the cost of contracting, at least by the fact that the parties need another 
contract to protect themselves from the consequences of breach.  In some cases – those 
economists like to call “at the margin” – the costs would be so high that certain exchanges would 
not be made at all.
One of the most useful roles for the government is to provide what are called default rules 
– terms that apply when the parties do not explicitly specify otherwise.  The more efficient these 
rules, the greater the scope for exchange and thus the greater the gain in consumer welfare. When 
contracts are formed, even in the most complex transactions, parties do not find it useful to 
define the terms for every contingency possible.  Instead, courts, legislatures, and agencies have 
developed default rules that are like buying off-the-rack clothing rather than specially tailored 
clothes.  Rather than writing your own contract, you get it “off the rack,” as it has come down in 
the judicial and legislative pronouncements.24  Many of these rules of exchange are so basic – for 
example, rules against fraud, breach of contract, and deceptive advertising – that we do not even 
think about them as rules at all.  In this way, a vast and increasingly sophisticated common law 
has evolved to govern consumer and other commercial transactions.
Contractual terms, such as warranties and money-back guarantees, may alleviate some of 
the problems that would otherwise exist, such as information asymmetries.25   There are 
remedies are likely to lead to inefficiently high levels of breach of contract and the market is 
organized in a way that makes other methods of enforcing these agreements possible.”)
24 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal 
Choice of Default Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The 
Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied 
Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261 (1985).  
25 See, e.g., Howard Beales, et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 
J. L. & ECON. at 511-12 (noting that such contractual terms may partially indemnify the buyer 
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transaction costs involved in negotiating, forming, and enforcing contracts, however.  Moreover, 
as is well known, resort to courts for enforcement of consumer transactions is often economically 
infeasible.  When disputes involve small losses to consumers, private lawsuits are not a rational 
economic option for most because the costs, including non-pecuniary ones, associated with suing 
far outweigh any likely redress.  Class actions also suffer from structural problems that increase 
the risk of outcomes – such as inadequate consumer redress and excessive attorneys fees – that 
fail to protect consumer welfare adequately.26  Further, small claims courts often do not 
sufficiently reduce the costs of litigation.27
Market factors, such as a business’s concerns about repeat business and reputation, can 
augment the effectiveness of common law and overcome some of the incentives a seller might 
otherwise have to dishonor its agreements.  In return, common law can complement the 
operation of the market.  For example, having a judicial remedy reduces the risk of engaging in a 
transaction with a new entrant to a market, allowing the transaction to take place at lower cost.28
against making a wrong decision based on a lack of information and may act as a signal of the 
product’s quality since warranties are cheaper to provide if the products seldom fails).
26 See Thomas B. Leary, Commissioner, FTC, The FTC and Class Actions (June 26, 
2003) (identifying flaws in the class action system arising from the lack of an actual plaintiff, 
which increases the risk of collusive settlements between class counsel and defendant’s counsel, 
inadequate consumer redress, excessive attorneys fees, and the prosecution of meritless cases 
that harm consumers indirectly), available at, 
<http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/classactionsummit.htm>
27 See, e.g., Arthur Best et al., Peace, Wealth, Happiness, and Small Claims Courts: A 
Case Study, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343, 367 (1994) (“The complexity of the existing apparatus 
for collection in Denver forces many small claims judgment creditors to go to an attorney for 
assistance in collecting a judgment. These additional costs can severely undercut the otherwise 
low cost of winning the judgment.”).
28 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.1(6th ed. 2003); Todd 
J. Zywicki, THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF CONTRACT GOVERNANCE: AN ECONOMIC 
THEORY OF CONTRACT GOVERNANCE 65 (Working Paper, 2003) (noting that with reduced 
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This remedy encourages market participants to patronize new entrants, with whom they have not 
previously transacted business, who have no prior pattern of repeat dealing, and who have not 
yet established a reputation.
In some cases, even market forces and common law together may be insufficient to 
discipline bad actors.  One can easily imagine sellers unconcerned about repeat customers or 
reputation, or who make product claims that are difficult to verify, and who rely on the fact that 
few injured consumers will undertake the often difficult task of suing to vindicate their rights.
D. Leg 3:  Government agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission
When the ability of common law to protect consumers’ rights falters, as when injury 
claims are small individually but significant in the aggregate, and market forces are ineffective 
for the reasons discussed earlier, another institution may overcome these weaknesses and thereby 
reinforce the effectiveness of competitive markets and common law.  Public agencies –
entrusted to promote consumer welfare by preserving competition and protecting consumers –
work as a third leg of the stool, reinforcing these other two legs in support of the market 
economy.29
How the FTC supports competition (leg 1)
Our faith in the market is firmly grounded in the principle that free enterprise and 
competition best guarantee commercial freedom, economic efficiency, and consumer welfare.  
information about a potential trading partner, parties will be less willing to enter into contracts 
and trades that would be consummated if promises could be made more enforceable.  “Thus, at 
some point, the overall costs of relying on informal norms becomes sufficiently high that it 
becomes efficient to create institutions to enforce promises, despite the administrative costs of 
doing so.”) 
29
  Although other agencies are crucial to this task, see note 5 supra, the focus here is on 
the FTC.  Of course, government has its own limits, which must be considered when developing 
public policies.
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The United States has chosen antitrust law to provide the governing rules for competition in most 
sectors of the economy.  Competition policy protects consumers, not competitors.30  Antitrust 
law helps maintain effective competition by prohibiting conduct that unreasonably restricts 
markets.  Antitrust law is really "a form of regulation that competes with other regulatory 
structures"31 and, in most instances, makes direct regulation unnecessary.  The other option for 
addressing market imperfections is comprehensive sectoral regulation, which ordinarily entails
strict controls on prices, entry, and conduct.  For various segments of our economy, state and 
federal governments have adopted this latter strategy, often at great costs.  
Consumer protection policy also has a vital role in supporting markets.  It helps ensure 
that consumers can make well-informed decisions about their choices and that sellers will fulfill 
their promises and not increase sales by lying about their products.  Thus, prevention of 
deception helps consumers in two ways:  first, most obviously, by deterring deceptive sellers; 
and second by making it easier for honest sellers to make credible claims about their products.
Thus, loss of sales to a dishonest competitor is not the only harm the dishonest inflict on 
legitimate businesses.  If many sellers lie about their products, a pernicious atmosphere of 
consumer distrust may develop.  Such an atmosphere harms society in several ways.  Deceit by 
one group of sellers may lead consumers to doubt the integrity of an entire industry or to distrust 
30 See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) 
(noting that federal antitrust laws are designed “for the protection of competition, not 
competitors.” (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962))). 
31
  Timothy J. Muris, Antitrust's Next Decade, in BETTY BOCK, IS ANTITRUST DEAD? 55 
(1989). 
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markets generally.32  Deception by Internet sellers, for example, could discourage consumers 
from using the Internet to gather information and make purchases.  In such a world, truthful 
sellers must resort to extraordinary measures to persuade consumers of their honesty.  Even if 
honest suppliers take such precautions to show their trustworthiness, some consumers may avoid 
purchases that otherwise would improve their well-being.  A real-world example of this 
phenomenon is the effect of spam on consumer confidence in the Internet.
Not surprisingly, the FTC focuses heavily on preventing fraud and deceptive advertising. 
By striving to keep sellers honest, consumer protection policy does more than safeguard the 
interests of the individual victim – it serves the interest of consumers generally and facilitates 
competition.
How the FTC supports the common law (leg 2)
Under the FTC Act, the Commission seeks to stop unfair or deceptive acts or practices, 
thereby helping to reinforce the common law rules of exchange.  Simply stated, the core of 
modern consumer protection policy is to protect consumer sovereignty by attacking practices that 
impede consumers’ ability to make informed choices, such as fraud, unilateral breach of contract, 
and unauthorized billing.33  As discussed above, resort to courts for enforcement for consumer 
32
  Of course, some level of consumer awareness of potential deception is an important 
part of consumer self-protection and is why the FTC has an active consumer education program.  
See discussion of consumer education, infra, at note 41 and accompanying text. 
33
  After a long struggle with the extent of its unfairness jurisdiction, the Commission 
adopted a benefit cost analysis for unfairness, which was subsequently codified. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(n).  See J. Howard Beales III, The FTC's Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and 
Resurrection, Wash., DC (May 30, 2003) (presenting remarks before the Marketing and Public 
Policy Conference) for the history and current use of the FTC’s unfairness jurisdiction. 
Consumer sovereignty may be frustrated ex ante if, for example, important information is not 
provided. See Labeling and Advertising of Home Insulation, Statement of Basis and Purpose, 44 
Fed. Reg. 50218 (1979).  It may be frustrated ex post if sellers do not honor their contracts with 
consumers. See Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. 263 (1986), aff’d sub nom, FTC v. Orkin, 
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transactions often does not work well when many consumers suffer small injury.  While private 
class actions can provide some relief for class members, the FTC can act in the interest of all 
consumers, free from the conflicting incentives in current class actions.  In addition, 
administrative agencies, like the FTC, have developed areas of expertise, such as interpreting 
implied claims in advertising,34 that provide an advantage over courts when ruling on consumer 
matters involving certain complex issues.  
The Commission also can go beyond enforcing a particular contract provision to provide 
“rules of the game” that reduce consumer harm in the future.  The Commission can establish new 
default rules and procedures for transference of rights when it is otherwise difficult to do so.  
While seeking to facilitate the exercise of consumer choice, the agency is also highly cognizant 
of the need to avoid unduly shackling market forces.  For example, this balance undergirds the 
FTC’s approach to unsolicited telemarketing calls, through which consumers decide whether or 
not they wish to receive such calls and express their preferences effectively through the Do Not 
Call registry.35  Once these new rules of exchange are established, if transaction costs are low, 
parties can more easily transfer these rights.36
849 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir. 1988). The three-part unfairness test – the injury must be (1) 
substantial, (2) without offsetting benefits that outweigh the harm, and (3) one that consumers 
cannot reasonably avoid – is designed to provide a rational, empirical means to determine 
whether the challenged acts or practices interfere with consumers’ ability to make choices.
34
  Memorandum to FTC Chairman James C. Miller III from Timothy J. Muris, Director 
of Consumer Protection Bureau, on Definition of Deceptive Advertising, 42 ANTITRUST & 
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1058, at 699-708 (Apr. 1, 1982).  
35 See discussion of Do Not Call Rule, infra.
36 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 15-16 (1960) (“Once 
the costs of carrying out market transactions are taken into account it is clear that such a 
rearrangement of rights will only be undertaken when the increase in the value of production 
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E. Examining the FTC’s Consumer Protection Capabilities
 In antitrust enforcement and litigation, the FTC routinely analyzes specific industry 
details and institutional arrangements. The agency's methodology is analogous to case studies 
and, in its finest form, pays proper attention to the institutions that influence competition.37
Beyond the context of individual enforcement matters, careful case studies have enriched the 
understanding of such issues as market power and efficiencies, contributing to improvements in 
antitrust policy.38  The Commission has certain institutional attributes –  such as having a Bureau 
of Economics with over 70 professional economists –  that make it well suited to apply this 
approach, not only for competition but for consumer protection as well. 
Both consumer protection and competition serve the common aim of improving 
consumer welfare, and they naturally complement each other.  A focus on competition theory 
that excludes consumer protection is not only shortsighted but, given the growing importance of 
consumer issues, can ultimately be self-defeating.  Consumer protection policy that ignores the 
impact on competition can result in a cure worse than the disease.  The true measure of our 
contribution to the economy is our progress in increasing consumer welfare overall.  Thus, well-
consequent upon the rearrangement is greater than the costs which would be involved in bringing 
it about.”)
37 See Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, FTC, Improving the Economic Foundations of 
Competition Policy, George Mason University Law Review's Winter Antitrust Symposium, 
Wash., D.C. (Jan.15, 2003), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/improveconfoundatio.htm>.  (Discussing how to improve 
the economic foundations of antitrust and concluding that antitrust analysis, if performed 
correctly, uses a careful, fact-based economic approach grounded in a thorough understanding of 
the relevant institutions.)
38
  Noteworthy examples of this type work can be found in FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 
CASES (Ronald N. Lafferty, et al., eds., 1984).
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conceived competition and consumer protection policies should take complementary paths to the 
goal of promoting consumer welfare.
There may be multiple ways to ensure that competition and consumer protection policy 
work together.  Experience has shown it beneficial not only to use this approach but also to 
combine both the competition and the consumer protection functions in a single public 
institution.39  The Federal Trade Commission’s experience suggests several synergies from this 
arrangement.40  First, the consumer protection function can provide useful insights about how to 
execute competition policy.  In several important instances, enforcement of laws concerning 
advertising and marketing practices has improved the Commission’s understanding of how 
markets operate.  For example, the development of the agency’s health care antitrust agenda 
benefited from what we learned about the manner in which truthful advertising informs 
consumer choice.  
39 See Thomas B. Leary, Commissioner, FTC, The Federal Trade Commission and the 
Defense of Free Markets, at the David T. Chase Free Enterprise Institute, Eastern Connecticut 
State University, Willimantic, Conn. (Oct. 7, 2002) (“Competitive restraints (the antitrust 
violations), tend to raise the supply curve because they increase offering prices or restrain sellers 
in the market.  False advertising tends to raise the demand curve because it creates the 
impression that products are worth more than they otherwise would be if they were advertised 
honestly.  So supply and demand will intersect at a higher price, to the detriment of consumers, 
and society’s resources will be misallocated.  That is the nexus between our two missions and 
that is the fundamental justification for having both of these responsibilities in the same agency . 
. .”)
40 See American Bar Association, Report of the American Bar Association Section of 
Antitrust Law Special Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission 109-110 
(Apr. 7, 1989) [hereinafter “Kirkpatrick II Report”] (noting, inter alia, that combination of 
functions allows consideration of whether antitrust or consumer protection remedies are most 
appropriate and permits considerations of economic efficiency to inform consumer protection 
decisions).
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Thus, when the Commission studied the effect of advertising and commercial practice 
restrictions on the business of optometry in its consumer protection mission, it proposed 
Consumer Protection Trade Regulation Rules to challenge those restrictions and also pursued 
several antitrust challenges to attempts by professions to restrict new ways of delivering their 
services.  The Commission continues to share what it has learned as part of its competition 
advocacy program.  Recently, the FTC staff argued in comments to a state board that sellers of 
replacement contact lenses should not be subject to state professional licensing requirements 
because the possible benefit to consumers from increased protection did not outweigh the costs 
from the diminution of competition.   The board ultimately held that out of state lens sellers did 
not need a state license.41
The FTC’s consumer protection program also has raised the possibility of new remedial 
strategies in competition cases. One of the principal priorities of the Bureau of Consumer 
Protection in the early 1980s was to obtain redress for the victims of fraud.42   Today, the 
disgorgement of revenues obtained by fraud is a centerpiece of the agency’s aggressive anti-
fraud program.  The experience with restitution and disgorgement in consumer protection laid 
the foundation for the Commission to use those remedies in antitrust.43
41
  Connecticut Board of Examiners for Opticians, In re: Petition for Declaratory Ruling 
Concerning Sales of Contact Lenses, Declaratory Ruling Memorandum of Decision (June 24, 
2003). For another example of competition advocacy in the area of eye care, see Letter from the 
FTC to Ward Crutchfield, Tennessee Senate Majority Leader regarding Senate Bill 855 
involving regulation of the practice of Optometry (Apr. 29, 2003), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/be/v030009.htm>.
42 E.g., FTC v. H.N. Singer, 668 F.2d 1982 (9th Cir. 1982); FTC v. Southwest Sunsites, 
665 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1982); FTC v. Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 F.Supp. 1280 (D. Minn. 1985).
43
  Federal Trade Commission, Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies in 
Competition Cases (July 25, 2003), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/disgorgementfrn.htm>.
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The more important form of osmosis runs from competition to consumer protection 
policy.  Because of its antitrust responsibilities, the agency is well aware that robust competition 
is the best, single means to protect consumers.  Rivalry among incumbent producers, and the 
threat and fact of entry from new suppliers, fuels the contest to satisfy consumer needs.  In 
competitive markets, firms prosper by surpassing their rivals.  In turn, this competitive market 
has important implications for the design of consumer protection policies to regulate advertising 
and marketing practices.  Without a continual reminder of the benefits of competition, consumer 
protection programs can impose controls that ultimately may diminish the very competition that 
increases consumer choice.
Competition principles can help ensure that consumer protection is consistent with 
consumer sovereignty.  They remind us that some consumer protection measures – even those 
motivated by the best of intentions – can create barriers to entry that limit the freedom of sellers 
to provide what consumers demand. The Commission recently participated, for example, in a 
court challenge to a state law that banned anyone other than licensed funeral directors from 
selling caskets to members of the public over the Internet.  While recognizing the state’s intent to 
protect its consumers, the Commission questioned whether the law did more harm than good.  In 
an amicus brief, the FTC noted that “[r]ather than protect[ing] consumers by exposing funeral 
directors to meaningful competition, the [law] protects funeral directors from facing any 
competition from third-party casket sellers.”44  The synergy between protecting consumers from 
44
  Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission, Powers v. Harris, 
Case No. CIV-01-445-F (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2002), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/09/okamicus.pdf>.  The district court upheld the state law, and the 
matter is currently on appeal.  Powers v. Harris, No. CIV-01-445-F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2002). 
But see Pennsylvania Funeral Directors Ass’n v. FTC, 41 F.3d 81 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that 
forcing consumers to pay the funeral home mark-up on a casket constitutes substantial consumer 
injury); Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp.2d  658, 663 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) (overturning state law 
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fraud or deception without unduly restricting their choices in the market or their ability to obtain 
truthful information undergirds all of the Commission’s consumer protection initiatives today. 
F. The Commission’s positive agenda
In pursuit of its goal of improved consumer welfare, the Commission has developed a 
combination of expertise and staff that complements its strengths as an institution. These 
elements are necessary to the Commission’s success, but they are not sufficient.  To animate its 
principles and make the best use of its institutional abilities, a coherent vision of its overall 
mission must guide the Commission.  To draw a simple analogy, consider a manufacturer who 
has developed a great product prototype through studying what consumers need and has 
assembled a technologically advanced factory with a highly skilled workforce.  That 
manufacturer still needs a concrete plan to instruct its workers how to take raw materials and, 
using the factory’s tools, fashion them into a product that can be manufactured each day and 
provided to consumers at the optional price and quality level.  For the FTC, its positive agenda is 
the concrete plan for how its staff, using the Commission’s statutory and institutional tools, can 
effectively transform principles into reality for consumers through its daily actions.   
The agency’s success, in large part, reflects the shared vision of the agency’s role that has 
evolved for over 20 years through several administrations and Chairmen.  Experience with public 
agencies confirms a vital, often-stated conclusion of academic researchers:  no public institution 
achieves policy success without a coherent strategy for exercising its authority and spending its 
resources.  A key manifestation of an agency’s strategy is its positive agenda – a statement of the 
measures the agency intends to pursue to accomplish its substantive aims.  Without a general 
limiting casket sales to funeral directors); Casket Royale, Inc. v. Mississippi, 124 F. Supp. 2d 
434, 440 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (same). 
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strategy and a positive agenda, an agency becomes a passive observer, swept along by external 
developments and temporary exigencies.  
A positive agenda also provides essential guidance.  For the agency’s staff, a positive 
agenda focuses effort on measures most likely to fulfill the institution’s mission.  For the 
business community and other interested parties, a clear statement of intentions reduces 
uncertainty and facilitates compliance with the law.
The FTC’s positive agenda is founded on the principle that the first line of consumer 
protection is vibrant competition in a strong, working market.   In pursuing this agenda, the 
Commission, through aggressive enforcement and focused advocacy, strives to promote 
competition and encourage the unfettered exchange of accurate, non-deceptive information.   The 
Commission focuses on stopping conduct that poses the greatest threat to consumer welfare, such 
as fraud, deceptive advertising, and unilateral breaches of contract, employing a systematic 
approach for identifying and addressing serious misconduct, with special attention to harmful 
behavior in key industries.  When the Commission did not follow these principles, such as its 
attempt to prohibit advertising to children, it was perceived as being seriously off course.45
The FTC also uses the agency's distinct institutional capabilities through the application 
of its full range of tools –  prosecuting cases, conducting studies, holding hearings and 
workshops, engaging in advocacy before other government bodies, and educating businesses and 
consumers –  to address competition and consumer protection issues.  Beyond the immediate 
goal of stopping a particular bad practice or promoting a beneficial one, the Commission’s 
activities improve the institutions and processes by which competition and consumer protection 
policies are formulated and applied. 
45
  See Section III B. infra.
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Of course, prevention of consumer harm is far preferable to enforcement against bad 
actors, which is expensive and rarely makes injured consumers completely whole.  One of the 
best ways to protect consumers is to arm them with knowledge to protect themselves.  Thus, the 
FTC undertakes extensive consumer education on numerous topics, often working in tandem 
with other public and private institutions.46 Prevention is not solely up to consumers and 
government, however, and business can play an important role.47
Two interrelated developments – the accelerated development of communications 
technology, like the Internet, and the increasing internationalization of commerce –  are rapidly 
expanding opportunities for both consumer benefits and consumer harm.  Although the FTC 
strives to develop new tools to combat emerging harms, the pace of technological change and 
globalization is outstripping the Commission’s ability to cope on its own.48  Because the agency 
cannot be everywhere, it is actively encouraging other consumer protection institutions to join in 
its mission.  Thus, the Commission’s International Division of Consumer Protection works to 
46
  The gateway site to the FTC's inventory of business and consumer education 
publications is  www.ftc.gov/ftc/consumer.htm.  In addition, we have dedicated Web pages for 
hot topics, including the National Do Not Call Registry (www.donotcall.gov).  Examples of 
publications produced with other entities, both public and private, are:  Looking for the Best 
Mortgage?, available at <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/homes/bestmorg.pdf>; Miracle 
Health Claims, available at < http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/health/frdheal.pdf;> 
Businessperson's Guide to the Mail and Telephone Order Merchandise Rule, available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/mailorder.pdf;> and Telemarketing Travel 
Fraud, available at < http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/tmarkg/trvlfrd.pdf>.
47 See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, FTC, Do The Right Thing (Apologies to Spike 
Lee),   Cable Television Advertising Bureau, N.Y., N.Y. (Feb. 11, 2003) (encouraging publishers 
and broadcasters to engage in more rigorous screening for obviously deceptive weight loss 
claims, which harm not only individual consumers but also the perception of the market system 
overall), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/030211rightthing.htm>.
48 See, e.g, discussion on International Cooperation, infra.
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ensure that the consumer protection rules around the globe focus on practices that distort 
consumer choice and raise a serious threat to the proper functioning of markets. 
Part of the Commission’s positive agenda is thus to increase its effectiveness through 
cooperation with other institutions at all levels.  The FTC has worked with a number of other 
public and private institutions in the United States to ensure that when taking action, they 
consider the full range of consumer interests, including the benefits of competition.  For 
example, the FTC staff filed comments with the Food and Drug Administration discussing the 
value to consumers of truthful advertising,49 and it has filed numerous comments with the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on competition and electricity deregulation.50  The 
Commission routinely works with state agencies51 and private associations52 to advocate on 
49
  Comment of the Staff of the Federal Trade Commission to the FDA on First 
Amendment Issues (Sept. 13, 2002), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/09/fdatextversion.pdf>.
50 See, e.g.,Comment of the Staff of the Federal Trade Commission, Remedying Undue 
Discrimination through Open Access Transmission Service and Standard Electricity Market 
Design: Wholesale Power Market Platform White Paper, FERC Dkt. No. RM01-12-000 (June 
27, 2003), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/030627ferc.htm>.                                   
51 See, e.g., Letter from Staff of the Federal Trade Commission to the Louisiana Attorney 
General (Apr. 1, 2003),  available at <http://www.ftc.gov/be/v030008.htm>; Letter from Staff of 
the Federal Trade Commission to the Ohio House of Representatives on House Bill 325: 
Physician Collective Bargaining (Oct. 16, 2002), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/10/ohb325.htm>; Letter from Staff of the Federal Trade 
Commission to the Alaska House of Representatives on Senate Bill 37: Physician Antitrust 
Immunity (Jan. 18, 2002), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/be/v020003.htm>.
52 See, e.g., Letter from the FTC and the Department of Justice, Comments on the 
American Bar Association's Proposed Model Definition of the Practice of Law (Dec. 20, 2002), 
available at <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/12/lettertoaba.htm >.
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behalf of consumers.  It is also trying to make its actions more effective by increased cooperation 
with criminal authorities.53
III. How the FTC Puts these Principles into Action
After this discussion of principles, institutional structure, and a positive agenda, this 
paper now examines how these attributes take shape through the Commission’s consumer 
protection initiatives.  As the agency’s top priority is stopping conduct that poses the greatest 
threat to consumers, it is appropriate to discuss first Commission actions to combat fraud and 
then consider its advertising enforcement activities, with a special emphasis on actions involving
health claims.  To illustrate how to use the agency’s distinctive institutional capabilities to 
develop new rules in response to changed situations, the article next discusses FTC initiatives 
involving privacy and spam.  Finally, as examples of how the Commission tries to expand its 
influence to meet the new challenges of increasing globalization and advances in 
communications technology, the paper describes the Commission’s international outreach and 
our e-commerce initiative.
A. Fraud
Preventing fraud is a crucial part of the Commission’s support of the market system and 
the common law.  Fraud is essentially theft.  Fraud, like price fixing, distorts market forces and 
53
  The FTC staff frequently assists the Department of Justice and local United States 
Attorneys’ offices in criminal prosecutions.  Commission staff attorneys have been cross-
designated as a Special Assistant United States Attorneys, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 543, to assist 
several contempt prosecutions as well as other criminal investigations and prosecutions.  In 
addition, the Commission often provides significant investigative assistance.  See Report to the 
Commission On Project Scofflaw's First Five Years from the Bureau of Consumer Protection 
(Jan. 2002), available at < http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/01/projectscofflawreport.pdf>; Comments of the 
Staff of the FTC to the United States Sentencing Commission on Emergency Amendments to 
Sentencing Guidelines, Policy Statements and Commentary Implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (Dec. 2002), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/12/sarganesoxley.htm> . 
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limits the ability of consumers to make informed choices.  Fraud leads to inefficiency, causing 
consumers to allocate their resources unproductively.  Fraud also reduces consumer confidence 
and reduces the efficacy of legitimate advertising, thereby further diluting the amount of useful 
information to guide consumers’ choices.  This effect also raises costs for legitimate competitors, 
who must offer more assurances of performance to overcome consumers’ wariness.
Because fraud is often national in scope, and scarce federal criminal law enforcement 
resources are primarily used against such matters as drug trafficking and terrorism, fraud will go 
largely unchecked without the active leadership of the nation’s consumer protection agency.  Yet, 
through the 1970s, the Commission essentially ignored fraud cases.  Instead, the Commission was 
engaged in a rulemaking frenzy based on earlier court opinions that appeared to provide almost 
boundless authority to revamp whole industries based on authority to stop “unfair” practices.
The result was a series of proposed rules relying upon vague theories of unfairness that 
often had no empirical basis, could be based entirely upon the Commissioners’ personal values, 
and did not have to consider the ultimate costs to consumers of foregoing their ability to choose 
freely in the marketplace.54  The most prominent example of overreaching under this unfocused 
authority was a proposal to ban all advertising directed to children on the grounds that it was 
“immoral, unscrupulous, and unethical” and based on generalized public policies to protect 
children.55
54
  For a detailed contemporaneous critique, see Timothy J. Muris, Rules Without Reason: 
The Case of the FTC, AEI J. ON GOV. & SOC’Y REG. 20-26 (Sept./Oct. 1982).
55 See FTC STAFF REPORT ON TELEVISION ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN (Feb. 1978); Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking on Television Advertising to Children, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967 (1978).  A 
possible ban was one of three alternative remedies the staff recommended the Commission 
consider.  The other two were a ban limited to advertising of sugared food products thought to 
pose the most serious dental health risks and requirements that ads for sugared food products be 
balanced by nutritional or health disclosures funded by the industry.  At the same time, Chairman 
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The breadth, overreaching, and lack of focus in the FTC’s ambitious rulemaking agenda 
outraged many in business, Congress, and the media.  Even the Washington Post editorialized that 
the FTC had become the  “National Nanny.”56  Most significantly, these concerns reverberated in 
Congress.  At one point, Congress refused to provide the necessary funding and simply shut down 
the agency for several days.  Entire industries sought exemption from FTC jurisdiction, 
fortunately without success.  So great were the concerns that, after 1980, Congress did not 
reauthorize the FTC for fourteen years.  Thus chastened, the Commission abandoned most of its 
rulemaking initiatives and re-examined unfairness to develop a focused, injury-based test to 
evaluate allegedly unfair practices.57  In short, this rulemaking effort failed because it lost sight of 
the appropriate role of the Commission.
In stark contrast to the failure of the agency’s unfocused 1970s rulemaking agenda, the 
development of a vibrant anti-fraud program at the FTC in the 1980s is a great success story.   
Fortunately, the legal tools for such a program already existed.  In 1973, Congress had amended 
Pertschuk opined that the Commission could use unfairness, inter alia, to regulate the 
employment of illegal aliens and to punish tax cheats and polluters.  Michael Pertschuk, 
Chairman, FTC, Remarks before the Annual Meeting of the Section on Antitrust and Economic 
Regulation of the Association of American Law Schools, Atlanta, Ga. (Dec. 27, 1977).
56 The FTC as National Nanny, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1978, at A22.
57 See Letter from the FTC to Hon. Wendell Ford and Hon. John Danforth, Committee on 
Commerce, Science and Transportation, United States Senate, Commission Statement of Policy 
on the Scope of Consumer Unfairness Jurisdiction (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in International 
Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070, 1073 (1984) (“Unfairness Policy Statement”); Letter from 
the FTC to Hon. Bob Packwood and Hon. Bob Kasten, Committee on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation, United States Senate, reprinted in FTC ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 
1055, at 568-570 (“Packwood-Kasten letter”); and 15 U.S.C. § 45(n), which codified the FTC’s 
modern approach.
-28-
the FTC Act to allow the Commission to sue in federal district court and obtain strong 
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief – including redress.58
The Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection determined to use this authority to 
fight fraud.  It began by targeting the fraudulent sale of various types of unconventional 
investments.59   The double-digit inflation of the period that made traditional investments 
relatively unattractive propelled these “alternative investment” scams.  The first case involved 
defendants that fraudulently sold $300 million worth of diamonds for investment.60  Similar 
actions against boiler rooms selling advisory services for the federal oil and gas lease lottery 
followed as did actions against the sellers of worthless oil and gas leases themselves.  In this early 
period the Commission brought three cases against sellers of gemstones and five cases involving 
oil and gas.61
58
  Under the “second proviso” of the new § 13(b), “in proper cases the Commission may 
seek, and after proper proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunction.” Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408(f), 87 Stat. 576 (1973) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C.§ 53(b) (1997)). The statute provides that this authority may be used “whenever the 
Commission has reason to believe that any person, partnership, or corporation is violating, or is 
about to violate, any provision of law enforced by the FTC.” 
59
  Nevertheless, from the beginning of the § 13(b) program, the Commission has used this 
tool against a wide variety of scams, including real estate equity schemes, FTC v. Rita A. Walker 
& Assoc., No. 83-2462 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 5, 1983); business opportunity scams, FTC v. H. N. 
Singer Inc., 668 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1982), FTC v. Kitco, Inc., No. 83-467 (D. Minn. filed Apr. 9, 
1983); and travel scams, FTC v. Paradise Palms Vacation Club, No. 81-116 (W.D. Wash. filed 
Sept. 25, 1981).
60 FTC v. International Diamond Corp., 1983-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) ¶ 65,725 (N.D. 
Cal.1983).  The Commission previously had pursued administrative cases against unconventional 
investments.  American Diamond Corp., 100 F.T.C. 461 (Sept. 28, 1982) (complaint and consent 
order).
61
  In these initial consumer protection § 13(b) cases, Commission staff began the practice, 
still followed today, of working closely with other government agencies, such as the Department
of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management, and federal criminal enforcement authorities such 
as the United States Postal Inspection Service and the Secret Service in developing investigations 
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Before the shift to federal court, most of the Commission’s consumer protection work 
used its administrative process.62  Most investigations relied upon voluntary production of 
requested documents and information from the investigated targets, who had every incentive to 
delay.  This process had obvious drawbacks for addressing fraud.  Federal district court cases 
proved much more effective, enabling the Commission to bring fraudulent schemes to an 
immediate halt, to take the targets by surprise so that money might be available for redress, and to 
prevent destruction of records showing the extent of the fraud and identifying injured parties.  
Almost from the inception of the § 13(b) program, the Commission has used this tool not 
only to obtain court orders halting fraudulent schemes, but also to obtain consumer redress and 
other potent equitable remedies.  Very early in the § 13(b) consumer protection cases, the 
Commission began to seek, as ancillary to issuance of permanent injunctions, provisional 
remedies such as a freeze of assets, expedited discovery, an accounting, and the appointment of a  
receiver on the ground that these remedies would insure the effectiveness of any final injunction 
ordered.63
To make the best use of this approach, however, required new investigative techniques 
geared for speed and stealth. The primary new tool was taping of defendants’ sales presentations.  
It has been a critical technique in many of the Commission’s fraud cases.  At the same time, the 
and litigating cases.  Parallel investigation and prosecution by both the FTC and criminal 
authorities have remained an important aspect of the Commission’s § 13(b) program.
62
  Prior to the amendment that created § 13(b), the Commission occasionally used the pre-
existing § 13(a) authority, 15 U.S.C. § 53(a), to seek and the district courts to issue injunctions to 
stop the dissemination of false advertising pending the issuance of an administrative complaint.  
See FTC v. Thomsen-King & Co., 109 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1940).  
63
 FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc. 668 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1982) is a seminal case establishing  
the Commission’s authority to seek, and the district courts’ power to grant, all the traditional 
equitable remedies inherent in the authority granted by § 13(b) to obtain permanent injunctions.
Singer was the first § 13(b) case to attack a franchise or business opportunity scam.
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agency developed a group of professional investigators, trained to uncover fraudulent schemes, 
determine ownership and control of such schemes, trace assets, develop evidence, preserve 
evidence for trial, and testify in court.  Recently, Commission investigators have become experts 
in Internet investigative techniques and have provided training for hundreds of local, state, 
federal, and international criminal and civil law enforcement offices.
Once launched, the fraud program grew in importance and success.  Each succeeding FTC 
Chairman has expanded its scope and improved its operation.  During the 1990s in particular, the 
agency formed strong, working relationships with state and local law enforcement agencies, 
leading sweeps against targeted types of fraud, thereby greatly increasing the program’s 
effectiveness.  During the late 1990s, the program matured under the strong leadership of 
Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Bureau Director Jodie Bernstein into the flagship of the 
Commission’s consumer protection program.  From fiscal year 1983 until fiscal year 1995 - the 
first full 13 years that the Commission filed § 13(b) actions – the average number brought was 23 
per fiscal year.  During the Pitofsky-Bernstein years, that average skyrocketed to 71 filings per 
fiscal year.  Not surprisingly, as the number of filings increased, so has the amount of consumer 
redress awarded.  In fiscal year 2001, for example, the redress ordered was more than $250 
million.  In fiscal year 2003, nearly $873 million in consumer redress was ordered in 98 
judgments.
The Commission’s ability to protect consumers from these scams was aided immeasurably 
by the creation of the Consumer Response Center (CRC) – a central facility with trained call 
center staff and an automated call distribution system to record and respond to consumer 
complaints and inquiries.  The existing telemarketing fraud complaint database, in operation since 
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the early 1990s, was dramatically upgraded and revamped into Consumer Sentinel, a system 
linking law enforcers through a secure Internet web site.  The Consumer Sentinel system enabled 
the CRC staff to enter data from consumer complaint calls in real time.  Initially scores, and 
ultimately hundreds, of law enforcement agencies at the state, federal, and local levels joined the 
system, gaining access to the complaint database, as well as the opportunity to “cross-walk” their 
own complaint data into the Consumer Sentinel database.  Other entities, such as local Better 
Business Bureaus, also were invited to contribute complaint data to the Sentinel database.  
Consumer Sentinel strengthened the fraud program by improving the staff’s ability to spot 
emerging trends, to identify emerging bad actors more quickly, and to locate potential witnesses 
to support the Commission’s cases.  
 Of course, any program, no matter how good, can be improved.  To ensure that the 
Commission is using its database to its maximum potential, it has for the first time undertaken 
national surveys of fraud victims.  This information is vital to assess the significance of 
complaints the FTC receives, and more importantly, of complaints it does not receive.  In 
addition, it is likely that only an increased threat of criminal prosecution will deter some hardcore 
scam artists.  The Commission continues to work hard to develop relationships with criminal law 
enforcement authorities to encourage the prosecution of the worst actors.  This includes working 
with the Office of Criminal Litigation at the Department of Justice to determine the best cases for 
criminal prosecution, as well as developing staff-level relationships with Assistant United States 
Attorneys across the country to help them prosecute fraud that occurs in their back yards.64  Many 
64 For example, the Commission works closely with the Department of Justice, and 
directly with United States Attorneys, to develop criminal cases against fraudulent telemarketers 
after we obtain preliminary relief, including access to the premises and asset freezes.  See, e.g., 
FTC v. First Credit Alliance, Civ. Dkt. No. 3:00CV1049 (D.Conn. Dec. 5, 2001) (final 
settlement) (principal indicted by the Connecticut U.S. Attorney’s office); FTC v. North American 
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of the fraud cases the Commission brings are criminal theft and involve wire fraud, mail fraud, 
money laundering, or all three.  The Commission has had tremendous success, but is constantly 
working to improve relationships and processes to increase the number of criminal prosecutions.65
The challenge is to use limited prosecutorial resources efficiently; improving this aspect of the 
fraud program is a high priority.
B. Advertising66
As discussed above, the prevention of deceptive advertising helps consumers both by 
deterring individual deceptive sellers and by making it easier for honest sellers to make credible 
product claims.  While the Commission has had a substantial national advertising program since 
the agency’s creation in 1914, it became a central focus of the agency’s consumer protection 
mission in the 1970's.  The Commission continues to maintain an active program, adjusted to 
reflect the plethora of new advertising methods, such as infomercials, telemarketing, and the 
Internet.67
Charitable Services, Civ. Dkt. No. SACV 98-968-DOC (C.D.Calif. May 15, 2003) (final 
settlement) (principals Mitch Gold and J.P. Cohen were prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s office 
for the Central District of California, plead guilty, and were sentenced to eight and three years, 
respectively).
65
  For example, our Internet training program has helped create relationships with local, 
state, and federal prosecutors around the country, and has led directly to criminal prosecution of 
Internet fraud.  In April, our joint crackdown on Internet auction fraud with the National 
Association of Attorneys General included fifteen criminal actions.  See
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/04/bidderbeware.htm>. 
66
  The previous section discussed FTC enforcement actions against sellers engaged in 
fraud.  In contrast, this section discusses the Commission’s enforcement actions against sellers 
who normally do not make deceptive claims and whose products normally are reputable.  For 
short hand, the FTC refers to its law enforcement activities related to such sellers as its “national 
advertising program.”
67 See, e.g., Kent & Spiegel Direct, Inc., 124 F.T.C. 300 (1997) (infomercial);
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Advertising illustrates the intertwined nature of competition and consumer protection 
issues.  Advertising can be a visible manifestation of competition among sellers.  Claims in 
advertising also constitute legally enforceable promises made by sellers to buyers regarding 
certain product attributes. Comparative advertising provides a clear example of how advertising 
can implicate both competition and consumer protection issues.  A company engages in 
comparative advertising when it claims that its own product is superior in price or other attributes 
to the products of its competitors, e.g. , “A is 10% cheaper than B,” or “Brand X has fewer 
calories than Brand Y.”  Up until the late 1970s, many trade associations prohibited or 
discouraged the use of comparative advertising.  In 1979, after conducting an extensive study, the 
Commission concluded that:
Comparative advertising, when truthful and non-deceptive, is a source of
important information to consumers and assists them in making rational
purchasing decisions.  Comparative advertising encourages product improvement and 
innovation, and can lead to lower prices in the marketplace.68
Because truthful comparative advertising has such a positive effect on competition and 
consumers, the Commission announced that the agency “will continue to scrutinize carefully 
restrictions upon [comparative advertising’s] use.”69  Most trade associations no longer impose 
limits on comparative advertising.  
Unduly expansive principles of deception can impede the vigorous competition that 
comparative advertising usually provides.  For example, several decades ago, the Commission in 
FTC v. Lane-Labs-USA, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 3174 (D.N.J. June 28, 2000) (stipulated final order) 
(Internet); Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C.
§ 6101 et seq.  
68 FTC Policy Statement in Regard to Comparative Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 14.15(b) 
(2003); see also R. Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of 
Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 671 (1977) (discussing the advantages to consumers and 
competition that flow from comparative advertising).     
69FTC Policy Statement in Regard to Comparative Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 14.15(b) (2003) 
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Kroger70 challenged a grocery store that in newspaper advertisements truthfully compared its 
prices for specific grocery store items to those of a competing grocery chain.  Applying the 
standard that claims are deceptive if they have the “tendency and capacity to deceive,” the 
Commission concluded that these claims were deceptive, because they were not based on 
“methodologically sound” and “statistically projectible” surveys showing that the advertised price 
difference applied to all products sold in the two grocery chains.  The Commission did not rely on 
any survey evidence to support its conclusion, but instead relied simply on intuition.  Fortunately, 
this case and other cases like it71 led the FTC in 1983 to issue its Deception Policy Statement, 
replacing its outmoded “tendency or capacity to deceive” standard with the “reasonable 
consumer” standard.  This change helped  circumscribe the Commission’s concept of deception, 
thereby diminishing the agency’s ability to chill comparative advertising.
Because truthful and non-misleading advertising is critical for competition, the 
Commission also has been vigilant to prevent overly broad private and government restrictions on 
such advertising.  During the 1970s, for example, the Commission mounted a precedent-setting 
challenge to the American Medical Association’s prohibition on physician advertising.72
70 The Kroger Co., 98 F.T.C. 639 (1981), order modified, 100 F.T.C. 573 (1982).  
71 Some courts likewise were wary of blessing overly broad deception principles in 
Commission cases.  For example, in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, the Commission had concluded 
that consumers took away from an ad depicting clear automobile exhaust in a bag the claim that 
the gasoline used had removed “all harmful emissions from automobile exhaust.”  577 F. 2d 653, 
657 (9th Cir. 1978).  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge, now-Justice, Kennedy, 
rejected the FTC’s claim interpretation, explaining that “neither the courts nor the Commission 
should freely speculate that the viewing public will place a patently absurd interpretation on an 
advertisement.  . . . We do not think that any television viewer would have a level of credulity so 
primitive that he could expect to breathe fresh air if he stuck his head into a bag inflated by 
exhaust, no matter how clean it looked.”  Id. at 657.  
72 American Medical Association, 94 F.T.C. 701, 993-96 (1979), enforced as modified, 
638 F. 2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982).  
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Similarly, the agency frequently has criticized limitations that states have imposed or considered 
imposing on attorney advertising.73
The Commission similarly has been careful about the support it requires for claims under 
its advertising substantiation doctrine.  The doctrine, created in the 1970s, requires that all 
objective claims have a “reasonable basis” before the claim is distributed, and it has its genesis in 
fundamental deception principles.  If an advertisement makes an express or implied representation 
about the particular level of support for a claim, (e.g., “clinical tests prove our supplement reduces 
the risk of colds”), then consumers expect the advertiser to have that amount of support and are 
deceived if it does not.  On the other hand, if an advertisement does not make any representation 
about the support for an objective claim, consumers expect that the advertiser has a “reasonable 
basis” for the claim and are deceived if it does not.74
As applied in recent years, the doctrine provides sellers with substantial discretion in 
developing and making advertising claims.75  It does not set substantive standards (i.e., claims 
about “x” product must be supported by “y” tests), but instead takes a flexible approach, looking 
to the actual claim made by the advertisement (I have “x” support for my product) or to a series of 
73 See, e.g.,  Letter from Staff of the Federal Trade Commission to the Clerk of the 
Alabama Supreme Court (Sept. 30, 2002), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/be/v020023.pdf>.  
The Alabama Supreme Court ultimately rejected proposed restrictions on truthful attorney 
advertising in 2003.  See also Submission of the Staff of the Federal Trade Commission to the 
American Bar Association Commission on Attorney Advertising, Wash., D.C. (June 24, 1994).  
74 Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 813 n. 37 (1984), aff’d, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987).  
75 See, e.g., Novartis Corp. v. FTC, 223 F.3d 783 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (unsubstantiated claims 
for over-the-counter-drug), Unither, Inc., Dkt. No. C-4089 (July 29, 2003) (unsubstantiated 
claims for dietary supplement) (consent order); Interstate Bakeries Corp., Dkt. No. C-4043 (Apr. 
19, 2002) (unsubstantiated claims for food) (consent order).     
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seven flexible factors to determine whether the claim had a “reasonable” basis”.76   These factors 
include consideration of the benefits of a truthful claim and the costs of a false or misleading 
claim, thus expressly balancing the goal of preventing deception with the need to ensure access to 
truthful information and vigorous competition.77
C. Health Claims
An important part of the Commission’s program to regulate advertising involves health 
claims.  Products making such claims are prime examples of credence goods because of the 
difficulty in measuring the efficacy of a particular food in preventing any specific disease.  
Allowing such claims if truthful and non-misleading, however, has important informational 
benefits for consumers and helps consumers make better-informed food choices.78  It also benefits 
competition by spurring food marketers to develop and market foods based on their health 
attributes.  The evolution of the Commission’s treatment of such claims is an especially good 
example of the importance of pursuing an unified approach that respects the value of truthful 
advertising to both consumers and competition.
76
  FTC Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation, 49 Fed. Reg. 31000, 
31000 (Aug. 2, 1984) (“The Commission’s determination of what constitutes a reasonable basis 
depends, as it does in an unfairness analysis, on a number of factors relevant to the benefits and 
costs of substantiating a particular claim.”); see Pfizer, 81 F.T.C. 23, 64 (1972).
77
  FTC Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation, 49 Fed. Reg. at 31000; 
see also JOHN E. CALFEE & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FTC BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, HOW SHOULD 
HEALTH CLAIMS FOR FOODS BE REGULATED?  AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, ECONOMICS ISSUES 
PAPER 35 (1989).   
78 See Comment of the Staff of the FTC before the Department of Health and Human 
Services Food and Drug Administration, In the Matter of Food Labeling: Health Claims; Dietary 
Guidance, Docket No. 2003-0496 (Jan. 2004), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/040126fdacomments.pdf>.
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“Health claims” for food contend that eating more or less of particular foods can lower the 
risk of chronic diseases like cancer, heart disease, and diabetes.  There is strong, developing, and 
continuously-changing scientific evidence concerning the relationship between specific foods and 
the risk of disease.  Most of these studies examine the role of overall diet on health.  Diets, of 
course, are comprised of individual foods, and healthy diets reflect individual food choices.  
Because the effects of a particular food on disease risk are difficult to study, however, claims for 
individual foods have long been a flash point for advertising and labeling policies.  Food 
regulatory agencies both in the United States and elsewhere have followed a variety of 
approaches, including prohibiting these claims in the name of protecting consumers from 
deception.  Even the Federal Trade Commission in the 1970s flirted with the idea of a ban before 
shelving staff proposals to do so.79
FTC staff economists have conducted empirical studies on the effects of these different 
approaches.  One particularly important study looked at sales of high fiber cereal before and after 
the landmark National Cancer Institute/Kellogg’s “All Bran” fiber advertising in the 1980s.80
Because that campaign occurred when such claims were technically impermissible under FDA 
79 In 1974, the Commission commenced an industry-wide rulemaking that would have 
banned all diet-disease claims as inherently deceptive. The Presiding Officer in 1978 
recommended that the agency at least allow a fatty acid and heart disease claim.  In 1980, the FTC 
voted to terminate most of this rulemaking to focus on case-by- case law enforcement, except that 
it decided to continue that part of its rulemaking concerning the fatty acid and heart disease claim.  
In 1982, the Commission discontinued its rulemaking entirely in favor of a case-by- case approach 
to health claims.     
80 PAULINE M. IPPOLITO & ALAN D. MATHIOS, FTC STAFF REPORT, HEALTH CLAIMS IN 
ADVERTISING AND LABELING: A STUDY OF THE CEREAL MARKET (1989); see also Information, 
Advertising and Health Choices: A Study of the Cereal Market, 21 RAND J. OF ECONS. 459-80 
(Autumn 1990).
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regulations, it offered a unique opportunity to compare the effects of advertising against other 
efforts – such as government information programs to alert consumers to the same information.
The study looked at Kellogg’s 1984 campaign claiming that All Bran cereal was high in 
fiber and that diets high in fiber could reduce the risk of cancer.  By 1987, three years after these  
claims began appearing in the marketplace, the study found that consumers had substantially 
increased consumption of high-fiber cereals.  The greatest increase occurred among consumers 
who had previously consumed the least amount of high-fiber cereal.  Most significant is that 
consumption of high-fiber cereals increased the most among the least advantaged consumers.  
Thus, the study demonstrated that truthful advertising can efficiently spread information widely.
Fiber-cancer health claims changed the cereal market, too.  Competing cereal 
manufacturers responded to Kellogg’s health claim by making similar health claims for their own 
high-fiber cereals.  The market share for high-fiber cereals increased by almost four percentage 
points, sales of high-fiber cereals increased by $280 million, and more high-fiber cereal products 
were introduced.
These and other analyses from the Commission’s Bureau of Economics make a powerful 
case for the role of advertising in helping consumers improve their health.  They underscore the 
wisdom of the Commission’s balanced approach that seeks vigorously to protect consumers from 
deception, while allowing them to benefit from the dissemination of truthful and non-misleading 
health information.
Other studies demonstrate that government regulatory policies directly impact the amount 
of helpful nutrition information available to consumers in advertising.  For example, in 1990, 
Congress passed the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (“NLEA”), which requires food 
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companies to petition the FDA for approval prior to making health claims on labels.  The NLEA 
also states that the FDA cannot approve such a petition unless “significant scientific agreement” 
among experts supports the claim.
A recent study by the FTC’s Bureau of Economics examined a sample of 11,647 food 
advertisements that appeared in eight leading magazines between 1977 and 1997.81  The sample 
revealed that heart disease and serum cholesterol health claims peaked in 1989, and then dropped 
substantially in the early 1990's following the NLEA’s passage.  Likewise, following the NLEA, 
advertisements for fats and oils no longer make claims about the health reasons to choose one fat 
over another.  The FTC study concluded that experience under the NLEA supports the hypothesis 
that the law and its implementing regulations decreased health claims in food advertising.
Of course, the NLEA has led to important benefits.  The NLEA’s nutrition labeling 
information box is widely and appropriately recognized as one of the most helpful nutrition 
regulatory actions ever.  But the FTC’s enforcement experience and empirical studies clearly 
show that following a more market-oriented approach will best serve the goal of providing 
consumer access to truthful and non-misleading health information.  Fortunately, the FDA’s 
Commissioner, Dr. Mark McClellan, has seized the opportunity to adopt this approach.  His 
Consumer Health Information for Better Nutrition Initiative will continue to protect consumers, 
but also allow them to receive more, truthful health information about foods and dietary 
supplements.82
81 PAULINE M. IPPOLITO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FTC BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STAFF 
REPORT, ADVERTISING NUTRITION & HEALTH, EVIDENCE FROM FOOD ADVERTISING 1977-1997 
(Sept. 2002).
82 See Announcement of FDA Task Force Report on Consumer Health Information 
Initiative (July 10, 2003), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/diethealthstmnt.html>.
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Under the Initiative, the FDA will determine the level of science supporting all proposed 
health claims.  The agency will place each proposed health claim into a category based on the 
level of supporting science.  Companies can make the proposed health claim if they include the 
qualifying language that the FDA has developed for claims within the category.  Companies thus 
will have greater freedom to make health claims if they are properly qualified to describe the 
amount of supporting science.83
This change may sound simply technical, but it can have a large impact.  For example, 
there is accumulating evidence on the relationship between foods high in Omega 3 fatty acids –
like certain types of fish – and the reduced risk of heart disease.  Based on this evidence, the 
American Heart Association has recommended that consumers eat more foods rich in these acids.  
Under the FDA’s old approach to health claims, food manufacturers had to wait until all the 
evidence on this relationship was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  They were prohibited from 
sharing emerging evidence about the benefits of Omega 3 fatty acids in reducing the risk of heart 
disease.  The old approach ensured certainty, but at the cost of delay in getting important health 
information to consumers.  The new approach will be a bit less definitive, yet it will get relevant 
health information to consumers far more quickly, allowing Americans to make better-informed 
choices sooner about what to eat.  
83
  The FDA has solicited public comment on whether to make permanent the approach it 
adopted in the Initiative.  In the Matter of Food Labeling: Health Claims; Dietary Guidance,  68 
Fed. Reg. 66040 (Nov. 25, 2003).  FTC Staff filed a comment stating that it finds this approach 
acceptable because it appears to recognize the importance of protecting consumers from 
deception, promoting truthful, non-misleading commercial speech, and ensuring flexibility in 
accommodating changes in science.  Comment of the Staff of the FTC before the Department of 
Health and Human Services Food and Drug Administration, In the Matter of Food Labeling: 
Health Claims; Dietary Guidance, Docket No. 2003-0496 (Jan. 2004), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/040126fdacomments.pdf>.
-41-
Of course, greater access to health information only benefits consumers if it is true and 
non-misleading.  Deception is unlikely to increase under the Initiative, however.  First, the FDA 
must still pre-approve all health claims for foods and dietary supplements.  Second, the FDA and 
the FTC have been increasingly coordinating their law enforcement efforts.  In December 2002, 
the two agencies committed to cracking down on fraudulent health claims for dietary supplements 
and other products.  Since December of 2002, the FTC has filed or resolved 17 enforcement 
actions involving false or misleading advertising claims for dietary supplements and other devices 
and therapies.  These were not small sellers; the estimated sales for these products exceeded $1 
billion.  With these actions, the Commission is proclaiming  that it will not allow deception to 
increase with the greater freedom to make health claims under the FDA Initiative.
D. Privacy  
Fueled by the development of the Internet, privacy emerged as a major consumer issue in 
the mid 1990s.  Most observers wanted to do something to protect privacy.  What to do was less 
clear.  
The debate over privacy showed clearly the importance of relying on strong principles to 
guide an institution like the FTC through new territory.  Grappling with the issues surrounding 
privacy required careful consideration of the basic questions of common law – why should the 
government protect privacy and what role should the government play in defining and enforcing 
privacy rules for private exchange?   Strong principles were needed to ensure that if the 
Commission went beyond enforcing a particular contract provision to provide new “rules of the 
game” that it develop those rules based on a deep understanding of the issues and an appreciation 
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of the possible harm if the new rules restricted the many consumer benefits that an information-
based economy offers.  
By June 2001, the agency had spent several years developing a sophisticated 
understanding of the issues through conferences and workshops.  Industry, spurred by consumer 
interests and the Commission’s activity, had begun addressing consumers’ concerns, especially by 
posting privacy policies on commercial web sites.  At that time many policy makers equated 
support for privacy protection as support for “notice, access, and choice” legislation on the 
Internet.84  Treating the same information collected from the same consumer differently 
depending on whether it was collected online or off was not grounded in coherent consumer 
protection policies, and it would certainly place online businesses at a competitive disadvantage 
for no apparent reason.   
1. The Inadequacy of “Fair Information Practices”
Fair Information Practices or “FIPs” appears to be an appealing model because it is 
seemingly based on consumer consent, on contracts between consumers and businesses.  In 
practice, however, consent is illusory.  For most consumers, the costs of exercising choice –
although not high – are not worth the perceived benefits.  Consider the billions of privacy notices 
84
  In its 1998 Report, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, the FTC summarized 
widely-accepted principles regarding the collection, use, and dissemination of personal 
information, known as Fair Information Practices (FIPs): (1) notice: data collectors must disclose 
their information practices before collecting personal information from consumers; (2) choice: 
consumers must be given options about how personal information collected from them may be 
used for purposes beyond those for which the information was provided; (3) access: consumers 
should be able to view and contest the accuracy and completeness of data collected about them; 
and (4) security: data collectors must take reasonable steps to assure that information collected 
from consumers is accurate and secure from unauthorized use.  The report also identified 
enforcement – the use of a reliable mechanism to impose sanctions for noncompliance with these
fair information practices – as a critical ingredient in any governmental or self-regulatory program 
to ensure privacy online.  See PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (June 1998), available 
at <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23.htm>.
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sent to consumers under Gramm Leach Bliley.85  Very few have exercised their right to opt-out of 
information sharing.  Part of the problem, no doubt, is the difficulty of understanding some of the 
notices, which can undoubtedly be improved.  A more fundamental problem exists, however.  
Exercising just one opportunity to opt-out may take a consumer only a few minutes, but opting 
out for each of the companies with which a consumers does business with would take much 
longer.  Given that time is scarce and even reading the notice takes effort that could be spent 
elsewhere, it is not surprising that few consumers opt-out, even when it is seemingly easy.
Nor is opt-in the solution.  Because most consumers will not expend the time and effort to 
consider the choice, opt-in is only the correct default if most fully-informed consumers would 
refuse to share information.  Explaining the benefits and costs of information sharing is beyond 
the competence of even the best drafted short notices.  One cannot make people focus on this, or 
any other, issue.  Moreover, many of the benefits of information sharing are beneficial 
externalities, in that they are absorbed into larger models of risk analysis, insurance actuarial 
information, and the like.  Thus, each individual, if given the choice, might prefer to free ride, 
gaining the benefit of these more accurate risk models while refusing to participate.
Thus, the FIPs model has fundamental problems.  Because considering the choice imposes 
costs apparently in excess of the benefits for many consumers, applying the model would not 
reveal consumer preferences.  Moreover, legislation codifying the principles runs the risk of 
unnecessarily hobbling development of the many benefits that an information-based economy 
85 Gramm Leach Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 682 et seq. (2001).
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could offer consumers.86  It is hard to describe in advance technology or beneficial information 
uses that have not been invented or even considered.  
2. New Framework
a. The Information Economy
An efficient model of information sharing balances the benefits of information sharing 
with the costs.  Surveys indicate that consumers are troubled by the seemingly excessive amount 
of information collection by on-line businesses87  At the same time, consumers willingly part with 
personal information every day to facilitate transactions.  For example, few consumers seem 
worried about the many companies that have to share their information to clear checks or, for that 
matter, to process ATM transactions.  They generally understand that the information must be 
collected and shared to complete the transaction.  Indeed, surveys reveal that most Americans are 
86
  Implementing Fair Information Practices can itself require difficult distinctions.  In the 
FTC’s Info Flows workshop, discussed more fully in Section IV below, a Senior Vice President 
of an international hotel company stated that a caller in Germany who wishes to make a 
reservation for a hotel in Washington, D.C., would probably call a reservation center in 
Amsterdam, which would use a computer data center in Georgia to make the reservation. The 
company might be pulling data from other countries as well.  He noted that under the European 
opt-in privacy model, his company must go to great lengths to disclose to consumers that their 
reservation information will be transferred overseas to be processed by a computer in Atlanta.  He 
stated that this is very costly in the aggregate, even if it only adds 5 to 10 seconds to each call and 
that consumers do not find this information helpful and may even find it confusing or annoying.  
Of course, a sensitive application of FIPs leads to the conclusion that notice and choice are 
unnecessary in this context.  But if one makes an exception here, why not elsewhere?  This 
example, and many others like it, illustrate the difficulty of making reasonable distinctions when 
applying FIPs in practice.
87
  That concern has been expressed in many public opinion polls.  See e.g., Alan F. 
Westin/Harris Interactive, Privacy On and Off the Internet: What Consumers Want (Nov. 2001); 
IBM/Harris Interactive, Multi-National Consumer Privacy Survey (Oct. 1999); Lorrie Faith 
Cranor et al., Beyond Concern: Understanding Net Users’ Attitudes About Online Privacy, AT&T 
Labs-Research Technical Report TR 99.4.1 (Mar. 1999). 
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“privacy pragmatists,” who care about privacy but are willing to share information when they see 
tangible benefits and they believe care is taken to protect that information.88
The American economy generates an enormous amount of data, mostly used by honest 
businesses for purposes that benefit consumers.  One example that was influential in forming the 
FTC’s alternative approach to privacy is the nation’s credit reporting system.  The agency has 
longstanding familiarity with this system through its enforcement of the nation’s oldest 
commercial privacy law, the 1970 Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).  
One often takes for granted the fact that the average American today enjoys access to 
credit and financial services, shopping choices, and educational resources that earlier Americans 
could never have imagined.  Today, consumers can check credit card and bank balances over the 
phone 24 hours a day; order books, clothes, or gifts online anytime; or review finances in a 
convenient, consolidated statement whenever it is convenient.  All over America, every day 
consumers who have good credit can borrow $10,000 or more from a complete stranger and 
actually drive away in a new car in an hour or less.  This "miracle of instant credit" has 
revolutionized the consumer economy. 
This “miracle” is only possible because of our credit reporting system.  The system works 
because, without consumer consent, very sensitive information about consumers’ credit history is 
given to the credit reporting agencies.  If FIPs were used, requiring notice and choice, consumers 
could then decide – on a creditor-by- creditor basis – whether they wanted their information 
88
 According to the March 2003 Westin/Harris Interactive poll, 64% of adults polled are 
“privacy pragmatists” who are often willing to permit the use of their personal information if they 
are given a rationale and tangible benefits for such use and if they sense that safeguards are in 
place to prevent the misuse of their information.  See
<http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=365>.  In a notice and choice 
system, however, most of these consumers are unlikely to take the time and effort in individual 
transactions to understand the benefits and costs of a specific sharing of information.
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reported.  Many consumers would not bother to exercise choice.  Consumers with poor credit 
would have an incentive to withhold the sharing of negative information.  The current system 
would collapse, and with it, enormous benefits to consumers.   The lack of choice does not mean 
consumers’ privacy is unprotected.  Because credit histories are one of our most sensitive pieces 
of information, their use is, and should be, carefully protected under the FCRA.89
b. Focus on the Misuse of Consumer Information
Consumers benefit from legitimate uses of information; such uses do not cause their 
privacy concerns.  Consumers are concerned, however, that information, once collected, may be 
misused to harm them or disrupt their daily lives.  It is these adverse consequences that drive 
consumer concerns about privacy.
Thus, the most important objective of a privacy agenda should be stopping practices that 
can harm consumers.  These include physical harm:  certainly, parents do not want information on 
the whereabouts of their kids to be freely available.  The misuse of information also can cause 
economic harm.  Such harm includes denial of credit – or even a job – based on inaccurate or 
incomplete information.  In extreme cases, the misuse of information also can lead to identity 
theft, our top consumer complaint category for three years in a row.  Finally, the misuse of 
information can cause annoying, irritating, and unwanted intrusions in daily lives.  These include 
the unwanted phone calls that disrupt the dinner or the “spam” that clogs our computers.
Focusing on the harms that occur when information is misused or inaccurate, rather than 
on notice and choice about whether the information can be collected or used at all, is a more 
workable approach.  Concentrating on harm reflects what troubles consumers the most, while not 
89 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.  The FCRA privacy protections are discussed in Section 3.e., 
infra.
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unduly restricting the free flow of information that benefits our economy.  It also imposes costs 
on harmful practices and the companies who use them, rather than raising the expenses of 
everyone engaged in commerce. 
c. Explicit Recognition of Trade-Offs
Targeting practices that involve misuse of consumer information also recognizes the trade-
offs inherent in any regulation designed to protect consumer privacy.  Privacy is not, nor can it 
ever can be, an absolute right.  Everyday consumers make practical compromises between privacy 
and other desirable goals – like having our briefcase or backpack inspected at the airport or before 
entering a building or a sports arena.   These trade-offs exist in the commercial sphere as well –
where information-sharing poses risks, but also offers benefits.  Like the FTC’s approach to 
protecting consumers from deceptive advertising, our privacy agenda seeks both strong protection 
of privacy and preservation of the important benefits of our information economy.  Ignoring the 
reality of trade-offs does not make them go away, it just makes it more difficult to craft coherent 
public policy.
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Focusing on a principled consumer protection policy also brings into question the 
FTC’s previous primary emphasis on addressing consumers’ concerns about online data 
collection.  If the concern is reducing the adverse consequences that can occur when 
information is misused, then it does not matter whether information is originally collected 
online or offline.  It simply matters if it is misused.  The risk of identity theft, for 
example, is no less real and the consequences no different if a thief steals a consumer’s 
credit card number from a website or from the mailbox in front of the consumer’s house.  
Equal treatment of information collected online or off provides better protection for 
consumers.  Moreover, an equal playing field for online and offline businesses is also less 
likely to impede continuing growth and development of Internet commerce.
3. Implementation of an FTC Privacy Program Based on Principles 
For two years, the FTC has implemented these principles through a variety of 
privacy initiatives.  To achieve its goals, in each of the past two fiscal years, the 
Commission has increased significantly the agency resources devoted to privacy.  In 
Fiscal Year 2002, it increased staff hours devoted to privacy issues by 60 percent.  
Compared to 2001, the agency now spends several times more of its resources on 
protecting consumer privacy. 
a. National Do Not Call Registry 
Perhaps the clearest illustration of the benefits of this approach is the 
Commission’s “Do Not Call” rulemaking.  It is no secret that intrusive phone calls that 
disrupt dinner and other increasingly scarce family time are a major annoyance to many.  
Not surprisingly, the response to the FTC’s National Do Not Call Registry has been 
overwhelming:  consumers have registered more than 57 million telephone numbers.
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One possible approach to this problem would be a complicated system of notice 
and choice about the collection and use of consumers’ telephone numbers.  This approach 
has severe limitations.  As the FTC’s experience under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
demonstrates, it is expensive to implement.  If the consumer even once gives permission 
to share his phone number, all prior efforts may be undone.  In any event, given the 
widespread availability of telephone numbers, the approach is also likely to be 
ineffective.   
In contrast, the approach encapsulated in the Commission’s rule is simple and 
straightforward.  It creates a default rule that consumers can continue to receive 
telemarketing calls unless they register.  But it also gives consumer a way to reallocate 
this default rule with low transaction costs.  It allows consumers themselves to decide 
whether they want to receive these calls at home.90  As noted above, the Commission 
strives to protect consumer choice by ensuring that such choice is not restricted or 
distorted before it is made or disregarded once it is expressed.  The rule’s real effect is 
not to supplant consumer choice but to provide each consumer an effective vehicle for 
expressing his or her choice.  Thus, this rule provides a clear example of the Commission 
using its basic principles to guide its actions.
The Do Not Call rule’s “business relationship” exception ensures that the rule 
does not sweep too broadly.91  The retention of the rule provisions allowing consumers to 
90
  This approach also reduces the transaction costs for consumers by making it 
easier to express their preferences about receiving telemarketing calls.  See R.H. Coase, 
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. at 15-16.  
91 
 One example of the exception’s benefits is for consumers who subscribe to a 
magazine and also register for the National Do Not Call Registry.  When the subscription 
is about to end, the telemarketer for the magazine can call the consumer and ask if she 
wants to renew without violating the Do Not Call provision of the Telemarketing Sales 
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“opt out” of future calls from any individual company ensures consumers control over 
even those calls.  Most significantly, in contrast to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley notice 
approach that has been estimated to have direct costs of as much as $1.25 billion92, the 
Commission’s Do Not Call rule has direct costs of only a small fraction of that amount.
The Do Not Call rule also illustrates the positive role that a centralized 
administrative agency can play.  In theory, one could arrive at a similar point through 
private contracts and market exchanges.  But this would require significant transaction 
costs because telemarketing calls come from all 50 states and from thousands of 
marketers and each state or each telemarketer may have a different system for allowing 
consumers to opt-out of such calls.  Even with centralized lists, there was no requirement 
that any marketer adhere to the list.  Clearly, it would be very difficult for a consumer to 
express his or her preference to each marketer.
b. Identity Theft
The FTC has established other privacy priorities using the same approach.  
Identity theft is a most serious form of misuse.  The agency addresses this problem with 
three main components: an Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse (the “Clearinghouse”); 
consumer education and assistance resources, including a toll-free hotline, web site, and 
Rule.  For consumers who desire to renew but ignore mail requests, this phone call is 
beneficial.
92 See <http://www.cei.org/gencon/004,01724.cfm>.  This article estimates that, 
on average, each of the 103 million U.S. households will receive 30 to 50 privacy notices, 
resulting in the generation of 3 to 5 billion notices annually.  At a cost of 25 cents to 
prepare, print, and mail the notice as an insert with a customer statement, the annual price 
will range between $750 million and $1.25 billion.  The article notes that these estimates 
do not include customer service and other administrative expenses – for example, the cost 
of adding paper inventory, rewriting software, printing, processing, postage and handling, 
adjusting operating machinery, and customer service.
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educational brochures; and collaborative and outreach efforts with law enforcement and 
private industry. 
The FTC’s primary role in combating identity theft derives from the 1998 Identity 
Theft Assumption and Deterrence Act (“the Identity Theft Act” or “the Act”).93  The Act 
directed the Commission to establish the federal government’s central repository for 
identity theft complaints and to provide victim assistance and consumer education.  The 
Commission also works extensively with industry to help victims, including providing 
direct advice and assistance when information has been compromised.  The agency has 
committed significant resources to assisting law enforcement.  Investigation and 
prosecution not only stop the offender from destroying another person’s financial well 
being, but also can deter would-be identity thieves from committing the crime.  
Moreover, as discussed below, the Commission can take enforcement action when 
companies fail to take adequate security precautions to protect consumers’ personal 
information.  
c. Enforcing Privacy Promises
Another serious form of misuse is collecting information under false pretenses or 
misrepresenting the purposes for which the information was collected, practices that 
clearly thwart consumer choice.  The Commission has undertaken aggressive 
enforcement against companies who violate promises they make about privacy, with a 
particular focus on promises made about the security provided for consumer information.  
Here, again, the FTC focuses on misuses of information that causes adverse 
consequences –  in this case, the use of information for purposes different from those 
93
  Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007 (1998) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1028).
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consumers bargained for or in a manner that creates unreasonable risks that information 
will be misused.  This focus on adverse consequences also makes the agency particularly 
concerned about misuses of sensitive information – for example, credit card and social 
security numbers, medical data, and information about children.  
Ensuring information security is a particular priority at the agency; poor security 
practices put consumer information at risk and can ultimately lead to identity theft or 
other serious misuses of information.  The Commission has thus far brought three cases 
challenging promises companies made about the security provided for consumer 
information – against Eli Lilly,94 Microsoft,95 and Guess.96  Each case involved the failure 
to implement reasonable security procedures to protect sensitive information, despite 
promises to the contrary.  Lilly involved information about consumers’ health.   Microsoft
and Guess involved credit card numbers, and Microsoft also involved personal 
information about children.     
The Commission is not simply condemning all security breaches.  While a breach 
may indicate a problem with a company’s security, breaches can happen even when a 
company has taken every reasonable precaution.  In such instances, the breach will not 
violate the laws that the FTC enforces.  Instead, the Commission recognizes that security 
is a process of using reasonable and appropriate measures given the circumstances.  
In the FTC’s first two offline privacy cases, it also challenged claims about how 
information collected from children – through surveys administered at schools – would 
94 Eli Lilly & Co., Dkt. No. C-4047 (May 10, 2002).
95 Microsoft Corp., Dkt. No. C-4069 (Dec. 24, 2002).
96 Guess? Inc. and Guess.com., Inc., File No. 022 3260 (June 18, 2003).
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be used.97 These cases, once again, involved sensitive information for which misuse 
could have serious consequences – including, for example, children’s name, address, 
gender, grade point average, date of birth, academic and other interests, and racial and 
religious background.  The Commission alleged that, in collecting the information, the 
companies represented that it would be shared only with colleges, universities, and others 
providing education-related services.  In fact, they shared the  information with brokers 
who sold it to buyers for commercial marketing.  In other words, students thought their 
information would be used only to help them get into college but ended up with 
solicitations for beauty pageants, shaving cream, and credit cards.
d. Consumer Information Security
Information security is a core part of any program of preventing misuse of 
information.  Good security is important to prevent theft and other misuses of sensitive 
information.  If there was any doubt, consider the TriWest98 and Ford/Experian99
incidents, in which major breaches of company databases put the sensitive personal 
information of tens of thousands of consumers at risk.  To prevent these harms, the FTC 
is emphasizing security on a number of fronts.
First, as just discussed, the Commission has challenged false statements 
companies make about their security practices.  These cases appear to be having an 
97 Educational Research Center of America, Inc., Dkt. No. C- 4079 (May 6, 
2003); The National Research Center for College & University Admissions, Dkt. Nos. C-
4071 & C-4072 (Jan. 28, 2003).
98 
 Adam Clymer, Officials Say Troops Risk Identity Theft After Burglary, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, § 1 (Late Edition), at 12.
99 Kathy M. Kristof & John J. Goldman, 3 Charged in Identity Theft Case, LA 
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, Main News, Part 1 (Home Edition), at 1. 
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effect: word is spreading, companies are changing their incentives, and the cases are 
helping employees convince their CEOs to take appropriate care in this area.   
The Commission also has an important new tool – the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Safeguards Rule – to help it promote and enforce good security practices.   Under the 
Rule, financial institutions must undertake certain basic steps to ensure that they have 
security appropriate for their businesses and for the information they collect.   These 
steps include designating someone to coordinate security efforts and assessing risk in all 
areas of the business that might affect the security of customer information.  
The FTC plans to enforce this Rule vigorously, and it is investigating companies 
that may not be complying.  But the chief value of the Rule is educational.  By requiring 
companies to take these basic steps, the Rule forces companies that may not have thought 
about security previously to study their practices and assess the risks to the information 
they collect and store.  The Rule could substantially reduce potential misuses of 
information caused by simple inattention to basic safeguards – such as when a company 
puts sensitive financial documents outside in a dumpster instead of having them shredded 
or burned.  
Moreover, the FTC is attempting to educate the public about information security.  
It has developed a web site, disseminated materials, and held several workshops to 
promote better security practices by consumers and businesses alike.100  As head of the 
100 See <http://www.ftc.gov/infosecurity>.  On September 26, 2002, FTC 
Commissioner Orson Swindle announced a multimedia and multifaceted consumer 
education effort to increase public awareness of the importance of good information 
security practices.  The FTC’s information security home page has registered more than 
200,000 accesses.  In addition, the Commission produced a video news release, which 
was seen on local news stations by an estimated 1.5 million consumers and distributed 
160,000 postcards featuring Dewie the Turtle, the campaign mascot, and his information 
security message to about 400 college campuses nationwide.  
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U.S. delegation to the OECD Experts Group for Review of the 1992 OECD Guidelines 
for the Security of Information Systems, Commissioner Orson Swindle, led efforts to 
revise the Guidelines, which were finalized in August 2002.101
e. Increased FCRA Activity
The Commission also is increasing enforcement of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.  
As discussed above, the FCRA strikes the same balance between privacy and the 
beneficial use of information that the Commission tries to achieve with the rest of its 
privacy program.  The FCRA allows credit data to be used to grant credit and other 
benefits but limits use of the data to certain “permissible purposes.”  It also requires steps 
to enhance the accuracy of the data, so that consumers are not denied important benefits 
due to errors in their reports.  One of the most significant steps is that consumers be 
notified whenever information in their credit report is used to deny them credit, 
insurance, employment, or other benefits or grant less favorable terms.  Consumers can 
then check their credit reports and correct any errors when they have the greatest 
incentive to do so.  When Congress was considering amendments to the FCRA, the 
Commission proposed that Congress strengthen this important safeguard.102
 In December 2003, the President signed into law the Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act (“FACT Act”), significantly amending the FCRA.103  The  FACT Act 
has three fundamental goals:  to improve consumers’ ability to prevent and remedy 
101 See <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/08/oecdsecurity.htm>. 
102 See Commission Testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, United States Senate (July 10, 2003), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/fcrasenatetest.htm>.
103 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, H.R. 2622 (signed into law Dec. 4, 
2003).
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identity theft; strengthen privacy and other consumer protections in the FCRA; and make 
permanent the national credit reporting standards that would have otherwise expired at 
the end of 2003.  To implement the new law, Congress placed extensive obligations on 
the FTC and other federal regulators to promulgate rules and conduct studies.
All three of the FACT Act goals reflect the balancing of interests necessary for 
sound consumer protection policy.  To reduce identity theft, the FACT Act creates a 
number of new approaches, many of which are based on providing businesses and 
consumers the proper incentives and tools to fight it.  For example, the Act requires 
financial regulators to develop identity theft “red flags” for the regulated institutions to 
adhere to when granting credit.  The Act also provides for greater information exchange 
between victims, creditors, and consumer reporting agencies once the theft has occurred.
The FACT Act also includes new ways to help consumers express their privacy 
preferences.  For example, a consumer’s ability to opt out of prescreened credit and 
insurance offers will be enhanced by an FTC rulemaking designed to make the opt out 
notice included in these offers clearer and more effective.
The FACT Act has also strengthened the accuracy requirements of the FCRA, and 
one of its new provisions is worth highlighting because it illustrates the careful balance 
the FCRA strikes between privacy and the beneficial use of information.  The FCRA 
already requires credit grantors to issue an “adverse action” notice to notify consumers 
whenever information in their credit report is used to deny them credit, insurance, 
employment, or other benefits.  The FACT Act includes a new requirement that credit 
grantors notify consumers when, based in whole or in part on the consumer’s credit 
report, the grantor offers terms materially less favorable than those available to a 
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substantial proportion of its other customers.  This so-called “risk-based pricing notice” 
addresses the increasingly common situation in which creditors do not outright deny 
credit to less credit-worthy consumers but rather raise rates or impose other restrictions 
on those consumers to compensate for their higher risk.  The new notice is designed to 
fill gaps in the existing adverse action requirement of the FCRA, which exempts, for 
example, situations when the consumer accepts a counter-offer of less favorable terms.104
The FACT Act also gives consumers the right to one free credit report each year 
from each of the nationwide consumer reporting agencies, as well as the right to purchase 
their credit scores, so that they can spot possible errors.  Finally, the FACT Act ensures 
that the national credit reporting standards that have, at least in part, facilitated the 
development of our highly successful credit system remain in place.105
The FTC has maintained an active enforcement program to ensure that all of the 
players in the credit reporting system comply with their obligations.  It continues to 
enforce the adverse action notification requirements of creditors and recently reached a 
settlement with an internet lender that failed to provide such notices to prospective 
104
  The Commission had urged Congress to broaden the notification requirements 
and worked with Congressional staffers in formulating the new risk-based pricing 
provision.  See Commission Testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, United States Senate (July 10, 2003), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/fcrasenatetest.htm>.
105
  The FCRA provides uniform standards and preempts state laws with respect to 
(1) the prescreening of consumer reports, (2) the time within which CRAs must 
investigate consumer disputes, (3) the adverse action duties of users of consumer reports, 
(4) the duties of furnishers, (5) the age of information allowed in consumer reports, (6) 
the exchange of information among affiliated companies, and (7) certain consumer 
disclosures.   These standards were scheduled to sunset on January 1, 2004, but were 
made permanent by FACTA.  See FACTA § 711(3).
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borrowers to whom they had denied preapproval.106 In addition, the Commission has 
acted recently to prevent firms from using credit reports impermissibly, such as to solicit 
new business.107  It also requires that credit bureaus comply with their accuracy duties 
under the statute; for example, recently settling allegations against Equifax that it violated 
an FTC order requiring it to make personnel accessible to answer consumers’ questions 
about possible errors in their credit reports.108  The Commission also has brought recent 
cases against information furnishers who have provided inaccurate information to the 
credit bureaus.109
The Commission also is working closely with the credit bureaus on a voluntary 
initiative to address the consumer complaints it receives about information in credit 
reports, when consumers have used the credit bureaus’ dispute resolution process and are 
not satisfied with the result.  The agency will send the credit bureaus the complaints so 
106 Quicken Loans Inc., Docket No. 9304, Decision and Order (Apr. 8, 2003), 
available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/04/quickendo.htm>.
107 FTC v. Associates First Capital Corp., Civil No.1:01-CV-00606JTC (N.D. Ga.  
Sept. 19, 2002) Order Preliminarily Approving Stipulated Final Judgment and Order, 
available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/09/associates.pdf>.
108 United States v. Equifax Credit Info. Serv., Civil No. 1:00-CV-0087-MHS 
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 2000) (joint motion for modification of consent decree stipulating to 
payment of $250,000 in disgorgement by defendant).  See
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/07/equifax.htm>.
109 United States v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., Civil No.  03 12219 DPW (D. Mass. 
Oct. 2003) (Stipulated Final Judgment and Order as to Defendant Thomas D. Basmajian,
available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/11/0323014stip.pdf> and Order Preliminarily 
Approving Stipulated Final Judgment and Order as to Defendants Fairbanks Capital 
Corp., and Fairbanks Capital Holding Corp., available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/11/0323014order.pdf>; United States v. Performance 
Capital Management, 2:01civ1047 (C.D. Cal. 2000) Complaint, available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/08/performcomp.htm> and Consent Decree, available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/08/performconsent.htm>.
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they can both resolve them and identify and correct any systematic problems.  The 
program, which does not limit its ability to pursue law enforcement, will provide the 
Commission and the credit reporting industry with information on how well the system is 
working.
E. Spam 
Although the principles the Commission applies for consumer protection have 
proven useful in formulating an effective privacy program, they face their most 
significant test in dealing with spam.  There are some similarities between the spam 
problem and other agency actions.  Just as the unwanted intrusion into homes created by 
telemarketing calls implicates consumers’ privacy and frustrates consumer preferences, 
so too does the clogging of Internet mailboxes by unwanted and unsolicited commercial 
email, or "spam."  Spam has become one of the biggest intrusions into consumers’ daily 
lives.  People enjoy reading email they want, whether messages from friends or news 
about a sale at a favorite store.  Today, though, consumers’ inboxes are filled with 
objectionable and fraudulent messages.  
As discussed above, the National Do Not Call Registry will protect consumers 
from the unwanted intrusion of telemarketing calls while not unduly inhibiting the flow 
of useful information.  It is not apparent, however, that any regulatory solution exists for 
spam.  Spam is one of the most daunting consumer protection problems that the 
Commission has ever faced.
The problems from spam go well beyond the annoyance it causes.  These 
problems include the fraudulent and deceptive content of most spam messages, the sheer 
volume of spam being sent across the Internet, and the security issues raised when spam 
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is used to disrupt service or as a vehicle for sending viruses.  Although a single piece of 
spam to a single consumer causes de minimis economic harm, the cumulative economic 
damage from spam is enormous, and growing.  There is no reliable, empirical research 
regarding the costs of spam, but estimates – guesses might be a better word – have ranged 
from $10 billion to $87 billion a year.110
Despite the concerted efforts of government regulators, legislators, Internet 
service providers, and other interested parties, the problem continues to worsen.  
Virtually all of the panelists at the FTC’s 2003 Spam Forum111 opined that the volume of 
unsolicited email is increasing exponentially and that we are at a “tipping point,” 
requiring some action to avert deep erosion of public confidence that could hinder, or 
even, for many, destroy, email as a tool for communication and online commerce.  In 
other words, spam is “killing the killer app.”112  This is a concrete example of the harm
110
  These estimates cover everything from the cost of anti-spam technology, such 
as filters, to the cost of lost worker productivity.  See Saul Hansell, Totaling Up the Bill 
for Spam, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2003, § C, col. 2 (Late Edition): 
Ferris Research, says the cost is $10 billion in the United 
States this year. The Radicati Group estimates the 
worldwide cost at $20.5 billion. Another firm, 
Nucleus Research, shoots higher. By its reckoning, the 
economic cost is $874 a year for every office worker with 
an e-mail account, which multiplied by 100 million such 
workers amounts to about $87 billion for the United States.
111
  The Commission convened a three-day forum to discuss the problems posed 
by spam from April 30 to May 2, 2003.  The panelists included representatives of ISPs, 
marketers, law enforcement, legislators, technologists, and bulk emailers.
112 See Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on Unsolicited 
Commercial Email before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
United States Senate (May 21, 2003) (presented by Commissioner Mozelle Thompson 
and Commissioner Orson Swindle), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/os/spamtestimony.pdf>.
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that unchecked deception can do to the marketplace overall by degrading consumers’ 
confidence in all advertising via a certain medium.  This harm affects not just legitimate 
marketers, who must shift to higher-cost strategies to disseminate their message, but also 
consumers, who may pay higher prices because of the sellers’ increased costs or who 
may forego purchases that would be beneficial.
Two facts make spam different from other forms of marketing.  First, unlike 
telemarketers or direct mail users, spammers can easily hide their identity and cross 
international borders.  Email can be sent from anywhere to anyone in the world, without 
the recipient knowing who sent it.  Spammers are technologically adept at hiding their 
identities, using false header information, and routing their emails across borders and 
through open relays or open proxies,113 making it extremely difficult even for 
experienced government investigators with subpoena power to track them.  The FTC’s 
enforcement experience, and that of the few states that have tried to punish spammers, is 
that it can take months of investigation, and the issuance of a dozen or more subpoenas, 
simply to locate a spammer.  Although the Commission is dedicating significant 
113
  Because an open relay is an email server configured to accept and transfer 
email on behalf of any user anywhere, including unrelated third parties, spammers can 
route their email through servers of other organizations, disguising the origin of the 
email.  An open proxy is a mis-configured proxy server through which an unauthorized 
user can connect to the Internet.  Spammers use open proxies to send spam from the 
computer network’s ISP or to find an open relay.  See FTC Facts for Business, Securing 
Your Server: Shut the Door on Spam (January 2004), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/secureyourserver.htm> and FTC Facts for 
Business, Open Relays – Close the Door on Spam (May 2003), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/openrelay.htm>.
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resources to attacking deceptive spam,114 it is difficult to prosecute enough spammers to 
have a serious deterrent effect, let alone stop, or even slow down, the problem.
Second, there are fundamental differences between the costs of email and other 
forms of marketing.  Unlike phone calls or mail solicitations, sending additional spam is 
essentially costless.  Instead, recipients and Internet Service Providers bear most of the 
costs.  Because email technology allows spammers to shift the costs almost entirely to 
third parties, there is no incentive for the spammers to reduce the volume.  This shifting 
of costs encourages inefficiency because the total cost to send tens of millions of emails, 
if borne by the spammer, would presumably outweigh the proceeds that most spam 
generates.  Yet at the FTC’s Spam Forum, a bulk emailer testified that he could profit 
even if his response rate was less than 0.0001%.  Because there is virtually no marginal 
cost to increasing the number of messages, fraud artists and pornographers, who 
generally have little to gain from reputation, profit from extremely low response rates by 
sending untold millions of messages.  If spammers had to pay the actual costs of spam, 
normal market forces would eliminate much of the spam problem.
Because of the anonymity the technology affords, spammers are often 
exceptionally bold fraud artists, flooding inboxes with outrageous claims.  In April 2003, 
114
  In February, 2002, the FTC announced its first systematic crackdown on 
deceptive spam.  Since then it has tackled spam on three fronts:  law enforcement, 
education, and research.  To date, the agency has announced 57 enforcement actions 
targeting deceptive spam, and the staff continues to investigate and prepare new cases.  
Among other unfair or deceptive practices, it has challenged:
• false subject line information;
false “remove me” representations;
• false representations that a service could stop spam from other sources; 
• false claims that buying a spamming business opportunity could make you 
rich; and 
• “spoofing” –  forging the “from” line in an email to make it appear that the 
email was sent from an innocent third-party. 
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the FTC released a report analyzing false claims made in spam.115  To prepare the report, 
the agency staff reviewed a sample of approximately 1,000 pieces of spam.116  Of the 
1,000 pieces, 66 percent contained facial elements of obvious deception in the "from" 
line, the "subject" line, or the text of the message.117  When these data are further 
analyzed to exclude sexually explicit email and email hawking products or services that 
are permeated with fraud – such as chain letters, credit repair, and cable de-scramblers –
only 16.5% of the spam did not contain obvious deception and came from possibly 
legitimate marketers.118  The Commission staff further analyzed a random sample of 114 
of these pieces of spam, looking behind the header information to see who had registered 
the domain name for any web sites connected to the email by hyperlink. The staff found 
none from Fortune 500 companies, and only one from a Fortune 1000 company.119  The 
study also showed that only 2% of all of the sample contained an "ADV:" label – even 
115 FTC STAFF REPORT, FALSE CLAIMS IN SPAM (Apr. 2003), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/reports/spam/030429spamreport.pdf>. 
116 The sample came from three sources.  First, staff took 450 emails from the 
FTC’s "Spam Refrigerator" – a database of unsolicited commercial email forwarded by 
consumers to uce@ftc.gov; second, staff took 450 emails from the Commission’s 
"Harvest" database – collected from email accounts that staff set up to accept email, but 
from which no emails were ever sent; finally, staff reviewed 100 unsolicited commercial 
emails forwarded by FTC staff.
117
  The remaining spam messages were not necessarily truthful, but they did not 
contain any obvious indicia of falsity. 
118 The word “possibly” is appropriate because FTC staff has not analyzed this 
subsample in detail to screen for truthfulness. 
119
  FTC staff’s statistical analysis provides 95% confidence that less than 3% of 
the email in the database of over 11 million emails was sent by or on behalf of Fortune 
500 companies, and less than 5% was sent by or on behalf of Fortune 1000 companies.
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though laws in 11 states, including California, require such a label.  It thus appears that 
the overwhelming majority of spammers completely ignore state labeling laws.
Clearly, then, spam is a major problem that normal market forces will not 
overcome and is therefore a prime candidate for governmental intervention. The very 
technology that makes email such a powerful and revolutionary tool for business, 
however, makes spam a problem that the application of the Commission’s law 
enforcement and regulatory tools cannot solve.  There is no quick or simple “silver 
bullet.”  Rather, solutions must be pursued from many directions – technological, legal, 
and consumer action.
This is what the FTC is doing.  First, the Commission continues to investigate and 
prosecute deceptive spam, as well as the deceptive and unfair use of email technology.  
To leverage its enforcement resources, the agency formed a Spam Task Force consisting 
of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.  By providing technical support and 
coordination, the FTC hopes to encourage enforcement by state and local agencies to 
prosecute scams that likely originate outside of their jurisdiction.120
On December 16, 2003, President Bush signed into law the Controlling the 
Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (“CAN-SPAM” or 
“the Act”).  CAN-SPAM is the first federal law that specifically addresses unsolicited 
120
  The FTC has dozens of open investigations, many with criminal authorities.  
Recently, the Commission announced a case developed in conjunction with the FBI and 
the Department of Justice’s Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section that 
addressed a practice called “phishing” or “brand spoofing,” whereby spammers trick 
consumers into giving sensitive financial information by spoofing the brands of 
companies with whom they have existing accounts.  See
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/07/phishing.htm>.
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commercial email.  The Act enumerates unlawful conduct for spammers and authorizes 
the Commission to conduct a series of rulemakings and write a series of reports.121
Although CAN-SPAM itself, or for that matter any other possible regulatory 
approach, can do little to resolve the overwhelming volume of spam that is already 
illegal, it contains provisions that can assist state and federal law enforcers and Internet 
Service Providers in their efforts to attack the problem.  Among other things, it prohibits 
commercial email that contains false or misleading header information, uses deceptive 
subject lines, or fails to contain the Act’s required disclosures.122  Many of these practices 
violate other laws as well, including the FTC Act.  CAN-SPAM also requires that senders 
include a link to let consumers opt out of receiving further commercial email and that 
senders honor a consumer’s opt-out request within ten business days of receiving it.123
121
  CAN-SPAM provides the Commission with mandatory and permissive 
rulemaking authority to implement and interpret certain provisions of the Act.  See CAN-
SPAM Act §§ 3(2)(C) (mandatory rulemaking to determine “the primary purpose” of a 
commercial email message), 3(17)(B) (providing the FTC permissive rulemaking 
authority to expand or contract the categories of a “transactional or relationship 
message”),  4(c) (providing permissive rulemaking to modify the 10-business day period 
to act on opt-out requests if a different period will be more reasonable and to specify
additional aggravating factors if those factors substantially contribute to the proliferation 
of unlawful commercial messages), 13 (providing the FTC with general permissive 
rulemaking authority to issue regulations to implement the provisions of the Act), and 
14(b) (requiring the FCC, in consultation with the FTC, to promulgate rules regarding 
wireless spam).  The Commission must also provide Congress with reports on a Do Not 
Email Registry, CAN-SPAM Act § 9, the effectiveness of the Act, CAN-SPAM Act § 10, 
the use of bounty systems, CAN-SPAM Act § 11(1), and the use of ADV labels, CAN-
SPAM Act § 11(2).  Further, the Act requires the Commission, in consultation with the 
Department of Justice, to publish a mark or notice that must be carried by all commercial 
email containing sexually oriented material.  See CAN-SPAM Act § 5(d)(3).
122
  CAN-SPAM requires all commercial email messages to include a clear and 
conspicuous identification that the message is an advertisement or solicitation, a clear and 
conspicuous notice of the opportunity to decline to receive further commercial email 
from the sender, and a valid physical postal address of the sender.  CAN-SPAM § 5(a)(5).
123
  CAN-SPAM Act § 5(a)(4).
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More important, and potentially more useful for government prosecutors, are newly-
created criminal penalties for sending spam from a computer without authorization; using 
a computer to relay or to retransmit spam; sending multiple commercial email messages 
containing materially false header information; falsely representing oneself as the 
registrant or successor in interest to the registrant of five or more Internet Protocol 
addresses and sending spam from those addresses; or using information that materially 
falsifies the identity of the actual registrant for email accounts or online user accounts.124
The Act also authorizes private actions by Internet Service Providers, which may 
strengthen their ability to pursue spammers.
Although CAN-SPAM provides law enforcement with additional civil and 
criminal powers, it does not address either of the two problems that make spam so 
challenging to law enforcers: the low cost of sending spam and the anonymity that 
technology affords spammers.  Until these two issues are addressed, it is unlikely that 
anyone will make significant progress in controlling spam.
There are also additional tools, which are not in CAN-SPAM, that can provide the 
Commission assistance in finding and taking action against spammers.  In the 108th 
Congressional session, the Commission made several legislative recommendations to 
address the changing nature of the consumer marketplace and improve the agency's 
ability to cooperate and share information in cases and investigations relating to cross-
border fraud.125  The Commission’s recommendations focus primarily on improving its 
124
  CAN-SPAM Act § 4(a).
125
  On June 19, 2003, the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee reported out S. 
1234, the FTC Reauthorization Act of 2003, which includes all of the Commission’s 
legislative recommendations addressing cross-border fraud.  On October 1, 2003, the 
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ability to combat fraud involving foreign parties, evidence, or assets.  These proposals 
also would help the FTC fight deceptive spam.  Information presented at the FTC’s Spam 
Forum revealed that the path from a fraudulent spammer to a consumer’s inbox 
frequently crosses at least one international border and often several.  Thus, fraudulent 
spam exemplifies the growing problem of cross-border fraud, and the FTC’s legislative 
recommendations would be particularly helpful in investigating deceptive spammers 
more effectively and working better with international law enforcement partners.126
Without such cooperation, enforcement efforts could be rendered meaningless if the 
illegal spammers simply move offshore.
While enforcement has been an important first step in fighting spam, the 
Commission has taken additional measures.  Although spam is universally regarded as a 
major problem, there has been relatively little research about it.  Thus, as a second step, 
House Energy and Commerce Committee reported out H.R. 3143, the International 
Consumer Protection Act of 2003, which contains the FTC's cross-border proposals.
126 
  The FTC's cross-border proposal includes four main components.  First, the 
FTC seeks to strengthen its ability to cooperate with foreign counterparts, who are often 
investigating the same targets. Under current law, for example, the FTC is prohibited 
from sharing with foreign counterparts certain information that the FTC has obtained in 
its investigations. Legislation is necessary to allow the agency to share such information 
and provide other investigative assistance in appropriate cases.  Second, the FTC seeks 
enhancements to its information-gathering capabilities to obtain more easily information 
from federal financial regulators about those who may be defrauding consumers. The 
FTC also seeks enhancement of its ability to obtain information from third parties 
without the request triggering advance notice to investigative targets and thus prompting 
the targets to move their assets overseas.  Third, the FTC seeks improvements to its 
ability to obtain consumer redress in cross-border litigation, by clarifying the agency's 
authority to take action in cross-border cases and expanding its ability to use foreign 
counsel to pursue offshore assets.  Finally, the FTC seeks to strengthen international 
cooperative relationships by obtaining authority to facilitate staff exchanges and to 
provide financial support for certain joint projects.
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the Commission has conducted research on spam, including the Remove- Me Surf,127
Spam Harvest,128 False Claims in Spam Study,129 and the April 2003 Spam Forum.130
The Spam Forum in particular contributed valuable information to the FTC’s spam 
agenda and helped develop the contacts in the IT industry the Commission needs to stay 
well informed as it helps lead the fight against spam.  The Commission will continue to 
pursue research into spam and to work with its partners in industry, state government, and 
other federal agencies to provide the best possible information to consumers and 
businesses through consumer alerts, brochures, and other appropriate methods.
127
  In April, 2002, the Commission announced the results of its Remove-Me surf.  
The FTC and ten law enforcement partners tested whether "remove me" or "unsubscribe" 
options in spam were honored.  From email forwarded to the FTC’s spam database, the 
agencies culled more than 200 emails that purported to allow recipients to remove their 
name from a spam list. The agencies set up dummy email accounts to test the pledges, but 
discovered that the vast majority of addresses to which they sent the requests were 
invalid.  Most of the "remove me" requests did not get through.  Based on information 
gathered, the FTC has sent more than 75 letters warning spammers that deceptive 
"removal" claims in unsolicited email are illegal. See
<http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/edcams/spam/pubs/removeme.pdf>.  Since then, the 
Commission has brought two cases alleging that the defendants failed to honor their 
removal representations.  See FTC v. GM Funding, Civ. Action No. SACV 02-1026 DOC 
(C.D. Cal. filed Nov. 6, 2002); FTC v. Brian Westby, Civ. Action No. 032-3030 (N.D. Ill. 
filed Apr. 15, 2003).
128
  Ten agencies participated in the FTC’s Spam Harvest, an initiative designed to 
test which actions consumers take online put them most at risk for receiving spam. 
According to the investigators, spammers typically use computer programs that search 
public areas on the Internet to compile, capture, or otherwise "harvest" lists of email 
addresses from web pages, newsgroups, chat rooms, and other online destinations.  See
<http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/spamalrt.htm>.  
129 FTC MARKETING PRACTICES REPORT, FALSE CLAIMS IN SPAM (Apr. 30, 2003), 
available at <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/spam/030429spamreport.pdf>.
130
  Information on the Spam Forum is available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spam/index.html>.
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A third, key component of the FTC’s efforts against spam is educating consumers 
and businesses about how they can decrease the amount of spam they receive.  The 
agency’s educational materials provide guidance on how to decrease the chances of 
having an email address harvested and used for spam, and suggest several other steps to 
decrease the amount of spam an address may receive.131   The FTC’s educational 
materials on spam are available on the Commission’s website.132
Fourth, led by Commissioner Swindle, the Commission has brought together 
interested parties, including government, ISPs, marketers, and technologists.  This is a 
crucial component in the battle against spam because, in the haste to reduce the problem, 
it is important to avoid over-regulation that could impede the flow of useful information 
to consumers.  Including legitimate marketers in this discussion is essential because they 
have a strong interest in solving the spam problem – the sheer volume of spam and its 
impact on consumer confidence is eroding a valuable form of marketing.
Despite all these efforts by the FTC and state law enforcement officials, in the 
end, spam will only be reduced, if at all, through several technological improvements, as 
well as safer computing practices by users, that decrease the amount of spam evading 
ISPs’ anti-spam filters.  The seamless integration of anti-spam technologies into the email 
services consumers use will be crucial.  Ultimately, the Internet protocols for email may 
131
  FTC’s tips for consumers to avoid unwanted spam include: (1) try not to 
display your email address in public; (2) check the privacy policy before you give a 
website your email address; (3) use a unique email address, containing both letters and 
numbers; (4) read the entire form before transmitting your personal information through a 
website; (5) consider using two email addresses – one for personal use and one for 
newsgroups and chat rooms.  See <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/online/inbox>.
132 See <http://www.ftc.gov/spam>.
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need to be changed.133  Such a solution, however, is unlikely in the near term.  Until then, 
Internet Service Providers need to empower consumers by providing them the means to 
deal with spam more easily.
F. International cooperation 
As noted earlier, the development of the Internet and the related increase in 
international commerce provide enormous benefits to consumers but also have multiplied 
opportunities for consumer harm.  In developing new tools to fight these harms, the 
Commission has sought to multiply its effectiveness by working with other consumer 
protection institutions around the world.  Through these efforts, the FTC tries to ensure 
that consumer protection rules outside the U.S. focus on practices that distort consumer 
choice and raise a serious threat to the proper functioning of markets.  To this end, it 
hopes to foster consistent, market-driven policies internationally. 
The emergence of new technologies, especially global communication systems, 
has changed the marketing landscape.  Today, satellite networks broadcast 
advertisements around the world, with operators waiting to take orders in the caller’s own 
language.  Telemarketers routinely call U.S. consumers from Canada.  Most significantly, 
133
  At the Spam Forum, panelists discussed many technical initiatives, including 
possible changes in the email protocol by the Internet Research Task Force's Anti-Spam 
Research Working Group.  One proposed change is to insert identity, or authentication, 
into the email system, such as requiring correct routing information, which would prevent 
spoofing. Other proposals are to create systems for charging senders for bulk email.  
Panelists at the forum noted that while such changes might be necessary to address spam, 
an effective protocol change will be difficult to achieve in the near future given the 
consensus-driven procedures of the Internet Engineering Task Force (the group of 
technologists that devises Internet protocols) and the need for any protocol changes to be 
“backward compatible,” i.e., to enable email to be transmitted using technologies that 
predate the change.
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in many markets the Internet is transcending national borders.  Thus, one cannot avoid 
global consumer protection issues.
Given this trend, international convergence of consumer protection rules is 
especially important.  Greater consistency among consumer protection rules will reduce 
compliance burdens for businesses selling internationally.  In particular, the more 
commonality among different consumer protection regimes, the less burdened merchants 
are in complying with different, and potentially conflicting, rules.  Indeed, the European 
Commission recently found that 68% of businesses it surveyed agreed that harmonization 
of national consumer protection regulations would make cross-border advertising within 
the European Union more efficient.134  A study by the European Mail Order Trade 
Association found that five of the top ten barriers to selling across borders related wholly 
or in part to differences in national rules on commercial practices.135
More consistent consumer protection rules internationally also benefit consumers 
by ensuring that they have more choices.  Inconsistent rules can drive businesses from the 
marketplace, or deter their entry in the first place, thus reducing consumer choice.  As 
discussed previously, having uniform default rules facilitates exchange, enhancing 
134
  European Opinion Research Group EEIG and EOS Gallup Europe, Public 
Opinion in Europe:  Views on Business-to-Consumer Cross-Border Trade, 57.2 
EUROBAROMETER 52 (Nov. 14, 2002).
135
  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Concerning Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices in the Internal Market, 
Extended Impact Assessment at ¶ 1.4, available at
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shopping/fair_bus_pract/impact_as
sessement_en.pdf.>
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consumer welfare.136  Because there will be more competition with better rules, 
consumers should also benefit from lower prices.  
For these reasons, the development of international consumer protection policies 
is a priority for the Commission.  In 2002, the agency created an International Division of 
Consumer Protection, which seeks international rules that promote a consistent market-
oriented approach to consumer protection. As with consumer protection in general, the 
first priority of an international consumer protection program should be combating fraud.  
Indeed, as the Commission’s domestic efforts have become more effective, scam artists 
have recognized that the FTC and its foreign counterparts face significant obstacles in 
trying to fight cross-border fraud.  Increasingly, scam artists take advantage of these law 
enforcement difficulties by using facilities in one country to target consumers in others.  
In 2000, 11% of consumer complaints filed with the FTC involved cross-border fraud; by 
2002, the number of cross-border fraud complaints had risen to over 14%.137  There also 
has been an increase in agency cases involving offshore defendants, offshore evidence, or 
offshore assets.  In 2002, for example, the FTC brought over 20 law enforcement actions 
involving cross-border fraud.  Cases in 2003 year involved advance fee credit cards 
peddled by Canadian telemarketers,138 allegedly bogus international driving licenses 
136 See Section II C & D, supra.
137
  For complete statistics on the growth of cross-border fraud, see 
<http://www.consumer.gov/sentinel>. 
138 FTC v. STF Group Inc., Civ. Action No. 02 C 0977 (N.D. Ill. filed Feb. 10, 
2003), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/02/medplan.htm>; FTC v. Assail, Inc., 
Civ. Action No. W03CA007 (W.D. Tex. filed Jan. 9, 2003), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/02/assail.htm>.
-73-
advertised through spam email by defendants in Denmark,139 Israel, the Bahamas, and 
Romania,140 and products and programs sold over the Internet by defendants based in 
Switzerland,141 Canada, the U.K., and Mexico142 that allegedly falsely claim to cure 
cancer, AIDS, and other serious diseases.
Fraud harms any economy, even a well-established one.  In emerging markets, the 
damage of fraud may be even greater.  It is bad enough that consumers suffer out-of-
pocket losses.  In a transition environment, fraud can undermine consumer confidence 
amid the uncertainty that often accompanies the abandonment of central planning.  The 
inability of Albania, for example, to address effectively the pyramid schemes that 
masqueraded as legitimate investments led to the fall of the government and a was 
serious setback to market reforms.143  Unless a nation visibly and effectively suppresses 
seller deceit, consumers may perceive that in a market system commercial dishonesty is 
the norm, not the exception.
139 FTC v. Carlton Press, Inc., Civ. Action No. 03-CV-0226-RLC (S.D.N.Y. filed 
Jan. 10, 2003), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/01/idpfinal.htm>. 
140 FTC v. Mountain View Systems, Ltd.., Civ. Action  No. 1:03-CV-OOO21-
RMC (D.D.C. filed Jan. 7, 2003), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/02/fyi0314.htm>. 
141 FTC v. Dr. Clark Research Ass’n, Civ. Action No. 1:03CV0054 (N.D. Ohio 
filed Jan. 8, 2003), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/01/drclark.htm>. 
142 FTC v. CSCT, Inc., Civ. Action No. 03 C 00880 (N.D. Ill. filed Feb. 6, 2003), 
available at <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/02/csct.htm>.
143 E.g., Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Albania, Pyramid Schemes Common 
Across Eastern Europe (Jan.16, 1997), available at
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997/01/F.R.U.<http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997
/01/F.RU.970116172653.htm>. Chris Jarvis, The Rise and Fall of Pyramid Schemes in 
Albania, 47 I.M.F. Staff Papers No. 1 (2000), available at
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2000/00-01/jarvis.htm>.
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Moreover, consumers in countries that fail to develop effective anti-fraud 
strategies may become especially attractive targets for fraudsters.  Countries that house 
the targets of cross-border fraud are not the only victims; countries that unwittingly host 
them suffer as well.  What country wants the dubious reputation as a haven for 
perpetrators of international fraud?  Thus, Canada is determined to resist attempts by 
fraudulent telemarketers to make Canada their safe haven.  A consortium of Canadian 
agencies that includes the Competition Bureau, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and 
provincial and local authorities have worked with us effectively to attack fraud.144
The Commission is building international consensus on the importance of 
combating cross-border fraud.  FTC Commissioner Mozelle Thompson chairs the OECD 
Committee on Consumer Policy, which, in 2003, announced new Guidelines for 
international cooperation to combat the growing problem of cross-border fraud.145
Importantly, the Guidelines will help governments work more effectively and efficiently 
to combat the increasing incidence of cross-border fraud.  The Guidelines create a 
common definition of “fraudulent and deceptive commercial practices” and express a 
commitment among OECD member countries to cooperate on combating these practices.  
In the United States, the government ha begun to implement these Guidelines to ensure 
that the FTC has the tools it needs to combat cross-border fraud.  As discussed above, the 
144 See, e.g., Cross Border case list at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/06/crossbordercaselist.htm>.
145
  OECD Guidelines for Protecting Consumers from Fraudulent and Deceptive 
Commercial Practices Across Borders, C (2003)116 (June 2003), available at
<http://www.oecd.org/sti/crossborderfraud>. 
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agency in June of 2003 proposed legislation to Congress that would make it easier to 
share information and cooperate with its counterparts abroad.146
G. E-Commerce
The FTC’s e-commerce initiative is another example of the Commission using its 
institutional strengths to support competitive markets and the common law as they adapt 
to technological change.  Although the Internet can provide consumers with important 
benefits, online commerce also has pitfalls.   As already noted, the Commission has 
undertaken many enforcement and educational efforts to protect online consumers against 
fraud and other problems.  These consumer protection initiatives will help the Internet 
continue to thrive as a legitimate and reputable sphere of commerce and likely lead to 
greater consumer confidence in, and use of, the medium. The Internet also raises 
competition issues.  While many states are regulating e-commerce to promote important 
public interest objectives, such as protecting consumers from deception and fraud, some 
of these actions also shield local businesses from out-of-state competition.  For example, 
some states require that online vendors maintain a physical office in the state, others 
completely prohibit online sales or shipments of certain products.  Many states also 
require that out-of-state sellers obtain an in-state license before selling particular goods, 
such as caskets or contact lenses, or services, such as medical or legal advice.  Some 
observers question whether the attendant higher prices and loss of variety outweigh the 
consumer protection benefits.147
146 See S. 1234 FTC Reauthorization Act of 2003; H.R. 3143, International 
Consumer Protection Act of 2003.  See supra notes 125, 126.
147 See Thomas B. Leary, Commissioner, FTC, The Significance of Variety in 
Antitrust Analysis (May 18, 2000) (essay based on a speech delivered at the Steptoe &  
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In March 2002, Commission staff commented to the Connecticut Board of 
Examiners for Opticians against the Board requiring that Internet sellers of replacement 
contact lenses have a Connecticut optician’s license.148   Such sellers merely mail out 
prepackaged lenses pursuant to a valid prescription. The staff concluded that the 
proposed requirement would increase consumer costs without offsetting health benefits 
and would hinder the expansion of Internet commerce.  Indeed, such licensing could 
harm public health by raising the cost of replacement contact lenses, inducing consumers 
to replace the lenses less frequently than doctors recommend or to substitute other types 
of contact lenses that pose greater health risks.  On June 24, 2003, the Board ruled that 
contact lens sellers located outside of the state who sell lenses to Connecticut residents do 
not need a Connecticut license, but must merely sell pursuant to a lawfully issued 
prescription.  The effect of the Board’s ruling is that state licensing or other requirements 
will not hamper Internet commerce in replacement contact lenses, which was the goal of 
the Commission’s advocacy.149
The issue of industry members imposing restrictions on consumer choice led the 
Commission, with the Department of Justice, to oppose a proposed bar opinion in North 
Carolina that required the physical presence of an attorney at residential loan closings, 
Johnson 2000 Antitrust Conference), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/atljva4.htm>.
148
  Comments of the Staff of the Federal Trade Commission, Intervener, before 
the Connecticut Board of Examiners for Opticians (Mar. 27, 2002), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/be/v020007.htm>.
149
  Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission, Powers v. 
Harris, Case No. CIV-01-445-F (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2002), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/09/okamicus.pdf>.
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including simple refinancings.150  The Commission argued that the proposal would not 
only raise costs for consumers, who would have to pay for additional services, but also 
created an uneven playing field for out-of-state Internet lenders, because in-state lenders 
were allowed to close loans without attorneys.   In January 2003, the state bar adopted a 
pair of opinions that eliminate the requirement that an attorney be physically present at 
closings.  The opinions also allow non-attorneys to obtain signatures and receive and 
disburse funds.  This outcome preserved competition for consumers in real estate 
closings, ensured even greater consumer choice, and helped promote Internet lending 
options for North Carolina consumers.
 The Commission also has addressed these issues in other states151 and on a 
national scale.  In late 2002, the FTC and the Department of Justice wrote to an American 
Bar Association (ABA) task force that was considering a proposed model definition of 
the practice of law.152  The letter urged the ABA not to adopt the proposed definition, 
which was over broad and could restrain competition between lawyers and nonlawyers to 
provide similar services to consumers.  The agencies cautioned that, if adopted by state 
150
  Letter from Charles A. James and Timothy J. Muris to the Ethics Committee 
of the North Carolina Bar Re: North Carolina State Bar Opinions Restricting Involvement 
of Non-Attorneys in Real Estate Closings and Refinancing Transactions (Dec. 14, 2001), 
available at <http://www.ftc.gov/be/VO20006.htm>.
151 See Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Comments to the 
State Bar of Georgia on Potential Unlicensed Practice of Law Opinion Regarding Real 
Estate Closing Activity (Mar. 20, 2003), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/be/v030007.htm>; Federal Trade Commission and Department of 
Justice Comments to the Rhode Island House of Representatives on Proposed Bills H. 
5936 and H. 5639: Proposed Restrictions on Competition From Non-Attorneys (Mar. 28, 
2003), available at < http://www.ftc.gov/be/v020013.htm>.
152
  Letter from the FTC and the Department of Justice, Comments on the 
American Bar Association's Proposed Model Definition of the Practice of Law (Dec. 20, 
2002), available at < http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/12/lettertoaba.htm>.
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governments, the proposed definition likely would raise costs for consumers and limit 
their competitive choices.  The letter also noted the lack of evidence that this competition 
hurts consumers and the substantial evidence that they benefit from it.  The ABA task 
force ultimately withdrew the proposed model definition and instead suggested that each 
jurisdiction adopt its own definition and determine who may provide services based upon 
the potential harm and benefit to the public.153
It is important to stress that the policy issue in the FTC’s e-commerce activities is 
not whether licensing and certification regimes should be scrapped.  The question is 
instead whether legitimate consumer protection, safety, and other objectives motivate 
refusals to permit reasonable accommodations of such licensing regimes or instead they 
represent a desire to exclude competitors from the marketplace.
IV. Policy Research and Development
This discussion of the FTC’s positive agenda identifies a necessary condition for 
the Commission’s future success in consumer protection.  Continuing, substantial efforts 
to increase the Commission’s base of knowledge are indispensable to address new 
commercial phenomena, to analyze complex technical issues involving health and safety, 
and to respond to new technologies that, among other capabilities, permit the assembly 
and rapid transmission of vast amounts of information.  All of these developments occur 
in a regulatory environment in which the Commission must use the force of its 
arguments, not fiat, to persuade public authorities at home and abroad to cooperate in law 
enforcement and other forms of policymaking.  
153
  American Bar Association, Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice 
of Law, Report to the House of Delegates (2003), available at 
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/taskforce_rpt_429.pdf>.  The ABA adopted this 
position officially in August 2003.
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The agency’s knowledge base is truly an investment in policy research and 
development (R&D).154  The Commission is the public equivalent of a private firm whose 
success requires substantial R&D.  Just as a high technology company must perform 
research to develop new products, so too must the FTC expand its knowledge to design 
law enforcement and other policies to conquer current and anticipated consumer 
protection problems.
A far-sighted feature of the FTC’s institutional design is that Congress gave the 
agency flexible tools to perform the necessary consumer protection R&D.155  Several 
examples illustrate how the Commission uses its distinctive institutional strengths to 
ensure that it accurately understands and properly responds to new challenges.   
Possible Barriers to E-commerce workshop
In October 2002, the Commission sponsored a three-day workshop on Possible 
Anticompetitive Efforts to Restrict Competition on the Internet.156  The workshop 
examined state regulations and private arrangements, often adopted for purposes 
unrelated to competition, that may aid existing bricks-and-mortar businesses at the 
expense of new Internet competitors, ultimately hurting consumers.  The workshop 
154 See Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, FTC, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade 
Commission and the Future Development of U.S. Competition Policy, Milton Handler
Annual Antitrust Review (Dec. 10, 2002), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/handler.htm>.
155
  For a recent definitive treatment of the FTC’s establishment, see Marc 
Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and 
Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. (2003) (forthcoming).
156
  Notice of Public Workshop and Opportunity to Comment, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,472 
(Jul. 24, 2002).  The workshop agenda, the participants’ written statements, and public 
submissions are available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/anticompetitive/index.htm>.
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sought to enhance the agency’s understanding of these issues, inform policymakers about 
how restrictive state regulation affects competition and consumers, educate private 
entities about business practices that may raise concerns, and learn of additional avenues 
to promote competition through e-commerce.  
More than 70 representatives of industry, academia, state and federal government 
agencies, and independent public policy organizations participated in the workshop and 
discussed possible barriers to e-commerce in ten different industries ranging from 
financial services to automobiles to wine.  The workshop spawned several projects.  For 
example, the FTC Bureau of Economics issued a working paper on the availability of 
wine over the Internet.157  The paper   examined the effect of Virginia’s ban on direct 
wine shipments from out-of-state sellers on price and variety available to Virginia 
consumers.  The study found that Virginia’s direct shipment ban reduces the varieties of 
wine available to consumers and prevents them from purchasing certain premium wines 
at lower prices online.  The FTC staff then issued a report assessing the impact on wine 
consumers of barriers to e-commerce.158  The report found that states could significantly 
enhance consumer welfare by allowing the direct shipment of wine to consumers. The 
wine report will be followed by reports on other industries discussed at the workshop.159
Each report will analyze the competitive and consumer protection aspects of the possible 
157
  Alan E. Wiseman & Jerry Ellig, How Many Bottles Make a Case Against 
Prohibition?  Online Wine and Virginia’s Direct Shipment Ban (Mar. 2003), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp258.pdf>.
158 FTC STAFF REPORT, POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE: 
WINE (July 2003), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf>.
159 See FTC STAFF REPORT, POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-
COMMERCE: CONTACT LENSES (Mar. 2004), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/03/contactlensreport.pdf>.
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anticompetitive barriers, including regulations and business practices.  What the 
Commission learned from the barriers to e-commerce workshop will continue to inform 
the agency’s advocacy and enforcement agenda.
Information flows workshop
In June 2003, the Commission held a workshop on Information Flows to examine 
the benefits and costs to consumers and businesses of the collection and use of consumer 
information.  As discussed above, the Commission’s privacy agenda focuses on stopping 
practices that cause real harm to consumers, while not restricting unduly the free flow of 
information that benefits our economy.  To help ensure that its approach both protects 
privacy and preserves important benefits, the Commission convened the workshop to 
learn from knowledgeable observers with a range of perspectives, including executives 
from a variety of businesses that use consumer information extensively, academic 
researchers, consumer privacy advocates, and government officials.  Panelists presented 
their original research and debated the appropriate methodology for evaluating 
information practices from consumer and business perspectives, including the appropriate 
use of benefit/cost analysis.  
More research is needed so that policy makers can understand more fully the role 
of information practices in our information economy.  The knowledge gathered at this 
workshop, and the future research that it is likely to spur, will help inform the 
Commission and other policymakers as they debate the difficult issues involving privacy 
and the free flow of consumer information.
FCRA Recommendation
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The FTC’s efforts to increase knowledge through workshops, such as the 
Information Flows event, are not merely aspirational.  Research presented at the 
Information Flows workshop helped guide the Commission’s recommendations on 
FCRA reauthorization.  As mentioned above, the Fair Credit Reporting Act tries to 
balance the beneficial use of information with the costs.  Participants at the Information 
Flows workshop provided research on likely effects of changes to the FCRA’s current 
uniform standards and preemption of state laws with respect to certain matters.160  This 
research indicated that allowing the national standards to expire likely would harm 
consumers. One study measured the impact of different scenarios of possible state 
regulation on credit score modeling and, ultimately, on the cost and availability of credit.  
The results suggested that the hypothesized changes in FCRA standards would alter most 
consumers' credit scores and lower the predictive power of scoring models, leading to 
increased delinquency rates or (to maintain current delinquency rates) restricted 
availability of credit.161  Based in part on this research, the Commission recommended in 
testimony before Congress that all of the standards be made permanent,162 and the FACT 
Act ultimately made such standards permanent.
160  See, e.g., Information Policy Institute, The Fair Credit Reporting Act: Access, 
Efficiency & Opportunity - The Economic Importance of Fair Credit Reauthorization 
(June 2003) [hereinafter IPI Report] which was submitted to the workshop and discussed 
by the workshop participants.  See also Fred H. Cate, Robert E. Litan, Michael Staten, 
Peter Wallison, Financial Privacy, Consumer Prosperity, and the Public Good: 
Maintaining the Balance (2003) (workshop submission), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/infoflows/statements/cate01.pdf>.
161 IPI Report at 9.
162
  Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on The Fair Credit 
Reporting Act before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
(July 10, 2003), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/fcrasenatetest.htm>.
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V. Conclusion
The FTC’s consumer protection program has been transformed during the past 25 
years.  This transformation clarified the agency’s mission and enhanced its effectiveness 
by better deploying its inherent strengths, to the benefit of both the agency and, more 
important, consumers.  What can one learn from this discussion of the underlying 
principles for formulating an effective consumer protection policy and the recitation of 
agency activities that illustrate these principles?  One key lesson is that, of course, 
principles matter.   An institution that merely reacts to circumstances and does not work 
from a coherent philosophy will ultimately fail to achieve lasting success.  Even if it wins 
a few battles, it is not orchestrating an overall strategy to succeed on a larger scale by 
reinforcing its strengths, filling gaps in the lines of defense, and carefully venturing into 
new terrain with a compass firmly in hand.
Beyond principles, an agency needs a plan for implementation.  The heart of the 
FTC’s strategy for consumer protection is the search for practices that harm consumers 
by hampering the competitive process and violating the basic rules of exchange.  While 
the Commission will do much of this work through case selection and prosecution, it 
should also make full use of its distinctive institutional attributes, including the ability to 
perform advocacy and conduct studies. 
A necessary condition for the FTC’s future success in consumer protection is to 
increase the Commission’s base of knowledge to address new commercial phenomena, to 
analyze complex technical issues involving health and safety, and to respond to new 
technologies.  This base of knowledge will enable the Commission to retain the 
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intellectual leadership necessary to persuade others to join it in its mission to foster 
consistent, market-driven consumer protection.  
